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ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
Buhm-Suk Baek

ABSTRACT
The idea of human rights protection, historically, has been considered as a domestic matter,
to be realized by individual states within their domestic law and national institutions. The
protection and promotion of human rights, however, have become one of the most important
issues for the international community as a whole. Yet, with time, it has become increasingly
difficult for the international community to address human rights problems collectively. Despite
a significant development in the human rights norms, effective protection of fundamental human
rights and their legal enforcement has a long way to go.
This paper will argue that economic sanctions can contribute to a decrease in individual
states’ human rights violations and can be an effective enforcement tool for international law.
The international community, including the U.N., should impose effective economic sanctions
against states where gross human rights violators are.
Economic sanctions have been widely used by the U.N. since the end of the Cold War. Their
purpose is generally not to punish the individual state but to modify its behavior. However, such
sanctions conflict with other fundamental principles of international law, namely the principle of
non-intervention and state sovereignty. Economic sanctions can also conflict with the WTO’s
first agenda: free trade. Even worse, economic sanctions are criticized because these sanctions
are, arguably, targeted at the people at large, not to the regime, a violator of international norms.
This paper will review the role of economic sanctions in international human rights law.
Chapter II examines the principle of non-intervention and whether its exceptions are in
international human rights law. Chapter III reviews the doctrines and practices of economic
sanctions for human rights protection by the U.N. Security Council, the U.S., and the E.U.
Chapter IV examines the legality of the economic sanctions against human rights violations
under the WTO system and reviews the possibility of the harmonization of international
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economic law with international human rights law. Lastly, Chapter V concludes by emphasizing
the importance of economic sanctions against human rights violations.
Based on the research outlined above, this paper concludes as follows:
Chapter II maintains that the relationship between human rights and state sovereignty should
and can be complementary. The protection and promotion of human rights can be enhanced with
a respect for state sovereignty. In other words, each individual state has a responsibility to
protect and promote the human rights of its own nationals based upon the principle of
sovereignty. State sovereignty and independence should serve not as a hurdle to, but as a
guarantee for the realization of the fundamental human rights of the state’s nationals. Chapter II
also concludes that the concept of human rights has been expanded and the core human rights are
inalienable and legally enforceable ones. The evolvement of international human rights law is
one of the most remarkable innovations in modern international law. If gross human rights
violations, especially those established by the status of Jus Cogens or obligations Erga Omnes,
are not solved by a state itself, it is no longer solely the problem of the state concerned.
Fundamental human rights have acquired a status of universality and the international
community should accept this.
Chapter III reviews the doctrines and practices of economic sanctions for human rights
protection by the U.N. Security Council, the U.S., and the E.U. All cases of economic sanctions
against gross human rights violations discussed, ten by the Security Council, five by the U.S. and
seven by the E.U., were provided as samples to illustrate the idea that economic sanctions by the
international community as a whole bolster fundamental human rights. This paper concludes that
the sanctions by the Security Council, the U.S. and the E.U. have at least some positive effects
on international human rights law. They build international human rights norms. This
development also leads to the growing willingness of the international community to impose
economic sanctions for human rights protection.
Undeniably, economic sanctions have had some negative effects on the targeted states. In
numerous reports and articles, scholars and human rights advocates have constantly argued that
economic sanctions hurt large numbers of innocent civilians in the targeted states. Economic
sanctions, however, cannot be the sole cause of civilian suffering in the targeted states. The
targeted states should bear the heavy burden of responsibility for this suffering. It is undeniable
that economic sanctions have inherent flaws. But, this paper disagrees with arguments for
ii

opposing the use of economic sanctions because of such flaws and negative effects. The problem
is not in the sanctions themselves, but in their effect. Therefore, the criticism on economic
sanctions should focus on finding a way to decrease their negative effects, rather than arguing for
not imposing them without providing a better alternative.

Overall, this chapter concludes that

economic sanctions have become part of a collective effort by the international community to
develop current human rights norms and to protect and promote fundamental human rights in the
targeted states.
Chapter IV concludes that while economic sanctions are inherently against the free trade
provisions of the GATT, economic sanctions against gross human rights violations are allowed
under the exceptional provisions of the GATT in the WTO system. This paper also argues that
the GATT should be interpreted consistently with international law. That is, trade restriction
measures against gross human rights violations are compatible with the GATT. As discussed in
Chapter II and III, fundamental human rights violations are no longer just the domestic concern
of each individual state. The evolvement of international human rights law demonstrates that,
first, international human rights norms recognized as Jus Cogens provide the legality for the
international community’s intervention in offending states; and second, the Erga Omnes status of
international human rights norms shows that every state has an interest in other states observing
these human rights norms. Overall, while some economic sanctions may conflict with the main
goal of the WTO, i.e. free trade, economic sanctions against human rights violations do not
undermine the WTO system itself. Rather, they can be adapted to the WTO’s free trade
framework under international law.
Since the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, there has been a
significant evolution toward the universality of human rights. However, international legal
enforcement systems for human rights norms are still underdeveloped despite the considerable
progress in international human rights law. This paper concludes that economic sanctions can
contribute to a decrease in individual states’ human rights violations and can be an effective
enforcement tool for international law.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Since the end of the Second World War and the subsequent adoption of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights by the United Nations (U.N.), individual states have recognized the
necessity for human rights protection.1 The idea of human rights protection, historically, has
been considered as a domestic one, to be realized by individual states within their domestic law
and national institutions.2 However, the protection and promotion of human rights have become
one of the most important issues for the international community as a whole.3 Yet, with time, it
has become increasingly difficult for the international community to address human rights
problems collectively.4
International law is a “horizontal legal system,” which can be characterized as lacking a
supreme authority, the centralization of the use of force and law enforcement generally entrusted
to central organs.5 In terms of international law being a law, researchers focus on the absence of
a legislature6 and on the matters of sanctions and compliance between the domestic legal
systems and the international legal system.7 However, international law as a horizontal legal
system operates in a different way from a centralized legal system and is based upon “principles
of reciprocity and consensus” rather than on obedience and enforcement.8 International law is a
useful and necessary tool for the international community because it enables states to fulfill their
1

Louis Henkin, at. el., Human Rights (Foundation Press, 1999) pp.73-79; Cheong-Kyun Kim, Jae-Ho Sung,
International Law, 5th ed., (Seoul, Pakyoungsa Publishing Co., 2003) pp.528-529.
2
Lori F. Damrosch, at el., Basic Documents Supplement to International Law, Cases and Materials, 4th ed., (West
Group, 2001), p.586.
3
Frank Newman & David Weisbrodt, International Human Rights: Law, Policy, and Process (1990) pp.1-17 cited
in Rett R. Ludwikowski, “Supreme Law or Basic Law? The Decline of the Concept of Constitutional Supremacy”, 9
Cardoza J. Int’l & Comp. L. 253, (2001)
4
See Jean-Marc Coicaud, at el. ed. The Globalization of Human Rights, (United Nations University Press, 2003),
pp.4-10.
5
Peter Malanczuk, Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law, 7th ed. (Routledge, 1998), p.3.
6
Ibid, p.6.
7
Lori F. Damrosch, supra note 2, p.23.
8
Peter Malanczuk, supra note 5, p.6.
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obligations, which they have chosen and agreed upon themselves, along orderly and predictable
lines.9
Since the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, there has been a
significant evolution toward the universality of human rights.10 An increasing number of human
rights conventions have been adopted to incorporate various areas of human rights: social and
economic rights, civil and political rights, the rights of children, women, refugees and
minorities.11 More importantly, most states in the international community have ratified a
majority of these conventions.12
While there has been considerable development in international human rights law,
enforcement systems for the human rights norms are still underdeveloped. The limited
jurisdiction and ineffective long-delayed justice of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and
other international tribunals, as well as the refusal of the U.S. to join a majority of human rights
treaties show that the international legal enforcement mechanisms for the protection of
fundamental human rights against gross violations may have a long way to go.13
This paper will argue that economic sanctions can contribute to a decrease in individual
states’ human rights violations and can be an effective enforcement tool for international law.
The international community, including the U.N., should impose effective economic sanctions
against states with gross human rights violations like the Sudan in the Darfur crisis and Burma.
Economic sanctions have been widely used by the U.N. since the end of the Cold War.14

9

J.L. Brierly, The Law of Nations; an Introduction to the International Law of Peace, 6th ed., Sir Humphrey
Waldock ed. (Oxford, 1963) pp.4-5.
10
Seok-Yong Lee, International Law: Theory and Practice, 3rd ed., (Seoul, Sechang Publishing Co., 2003) p.475.
11
Richard Clayton, at. el., Law of Human Rights, (Oxford, 2001) pp.3-4.
12
Sarah H. Cleveland, “Norm Internalization and U.S. Economic Sanctions,” 26 Yale J. Int'l L. 1 (2001) p.3.
13
Ibid, p.3.
14
August Reinisch, “Developing Human Rights and Humanitarian Law Accountability of the Security Council for
the Imposition of Economic Sanctions” 95 Am. J. Int’l L. 851, (2001) p.851.
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Their purpose is generally not to punish the individual state but to modify its behavior.15
However, such sanctions imposed by individual states conflict with other fundamental principles
of international law, namely the principle of non-intervention and state sovereignty. Economic
sanctions can also conflict with the WTO’s first agenda: free trade.16 Even worse, economic
sanctions are criticized because they target the people at large, not the regime, a violator of
international norms. It is possible to argue that even though the U.N. imposes its sanctions to
protect human rights, these sanctions disregard the same human rights principles themselves.17
Therefore, this paper will review the role of economic sanctions in international human
rights law. Chapter II examines the principle of non-intervention and its exceptions in
international human rights law. Chapter III reviews the doctrines and practices of economic
sanctions for human rights protection by the U.N. Security Council, the U.S., and the E.U.
Chapter IV examines the legality of the economic sanctions against human rights violations
under the WTO system and reviews the possibility of the harmonization of international
economic law with international human rights law. Lastly, Chapter V concludes by emphasizing
the importance of economic sanctions against human rights violations.

15

Ibid.
Sarah H. Cleveland, supra note 12, p3.
17
See Joy K. Fausey, “Does the United Nations’ Use of Collective Sanctions to Protect Human Rights Violate Its
Own Human Rights Standards?” 10 Conn. J. Int’l L. 193 (1994)
16
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II. SERIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS: A DOMESTIC

OR

INTERNATIONAL

ISSUE?
The world is still mired in widespread violations of human rights. Genocide has repeatedly
occurred in several regions since the Second World War.18 Floods of refugees and ethnic
conflicts continually challenge the international community’s capacity to respond; and gross
forms of torture and execution remain commonplace.19 The most recent example involves the
Darfur crisis in the Sudan.20 In such gross human rights violation cases, can one state (or states)
intervene in another state’s affairs on the grounds of human rights violations? Traditional
international law does not allow intervention in other state’s affairs. This chapter will examine
the principle of non-intervention and whether or not there is exception for serious human rights
violation.

2.1. The Principle of Non-Intervention and Its Exception
Oppenheim defined intervention as “forcible or dictatorial interference by a state in the
affairs of another state, calculated to impose certain conduct or consequence on that other
state.”21 In the 19th century, it was often associated with the armed intervention, on humanitarian

18

See U.N. High Commissioner on Human Rights, Commission on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination,
Summary Record of the Second Part of the 1665th Meeting, Dialogue with Juan Mendez, Special Adviser on the
Prevention of Genocide, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/SR.1665/Add.1 (Aug, 20, 2004) (Committee Member Shahi observing
that “regrettably, the United Nations itself had been ineffective in preventing genocide. There had been at least fiftyfive genocides since the Organization’s founding, in which approximately 75 million people had died.”) See also
Douglas Donoho, “Human Rights Enforcement in the Twenty-First Century” 35 Ga. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 1. (2006)
19
Douglas Donoho, Ibid, p.3.
20
See U.N. High Commissioner on Human Rights, Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to
the U.N. Secretary-General, available at http://www.un.org/News/dh/sudan/com_inq_darfur.pdf and (its updated
version) Report of the High-Level Mission on the situation of human rights in Darfur pursuant to Human Rights
Council decision S-4/101, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/4/80.
21
D.J. Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law, 5th ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1998), p.890.
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or other grounds by powerful European states in the affairs of other state.22 As the 1965
Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the
Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty23 indicated, it also includes other forms of
influence or control. For example, intervention in the external affairs of another state may
include a case in which state A sought to persuade state B to take a certain course of action by
threats or by other measures amounting to economic coercion. Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter
and the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and
Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations24 also clearly
22

Cheong-Kyun Kim, Jae-Ho Sung, supra note 1, p.188.
Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of Their
Independence and Sovereignty (21 December 1965), U.N. Doc. A/RES/2131 (XX).
The General Assembly.....solemnly declares:
1. No State has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external
affairs of any other State. Consequently, armed intervention and all other forms of interference or attempted threats
against the personality of the State or against its political, economic and cultural elements, are condemned.
2. No State may use or encourage the use of economic, political or any other type of measures to coerce another
State in order to obtain from it the subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights or to secure from it
advantages of any kind. Also, no State shall organize, assist, foment, finance, incite or tolerate subversive, terrorist
or armed activities directed towards the violent overthrow of the regime of another State, or interfere in civil strife in
another State.
3. The use of force to deprive peoples of their national identity constitutes a violation of their inalienable rights and
of the principle of non-intervention.
4. The strict observance of these obligations is an essential condition to ensure that nations live together in peace
with one another, since the practice of any form of intervention not only violates the spirit and letter of the Charter
of the United Nations but also leads to the creation of situations which threaten international peace and security.
5. Every State has an inalienable right to choose its political, economic, social and cultural systems, without
interference in any form by another State.
6. All States shall respect the right of self-determination and independence of peoples and nations, to be freely
exercised without any foreign pressure, and with absolute respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.
Consequently, all States shall contribute to the complete elimination of racial discrimination and colonialism in all
its forms and manifestations.
7. For the purpose of the present Declaration, the term "State" covers both individual States and groups of States.
8. Nothing in this Declaration shall be construed as affecting in any manner the relevant provisions of the Charter of
the United Nations relating to the maintenance of international peace and security, in particular those contained in
Chapters VI, VII and VIII.
(The Resolution was adopted by 109 to 0, with one abstention. The one absenting state was the U.K., which
accepted the “fundamental propositions set out in the resolution” but objected to the manner in which that resolution
had been evolved and the imprecision of some of its language.” See 1976 B.P.I.L. 35,36.)
24
Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in
Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (24 October 1970) U.N. Doc. A/RES/2625 (XXV).
.....The principle concerning the duty not to intervene in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of any State, in
accordance with the Charter
No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal

23
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state the principle of non-intervention in international law. Article 2(4) of U.N. Charter is stated
as below.
4. All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against
the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent
with the Purposes of the United Nations.

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has recognized the principle of non-intervention.25
Numerous General Assembly Resolutions have repeatedly emphasized the importance of the
principle of state sovereignty and non-intervention. Nowadays this principle tends to be extended
to other means of intervention, namely economic and cultural. 26 Concerning “economic
interference,” the principle of non-intervention reflects the nature of international law in

or external affairs of any other State. Consequently, armed intervention and all other forms of interference or
attempted threats against the personality of the State or against its political, economic and cultural elements, are in
violation of international law.
No State may use or encourage the use of economic, political or any other type of measures to coerce another State
in order to obtain from it the subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights and to secure from it advantages of
any kind. Also, no State shall organize, assist, foment, finance, incite or tolerate subversive, terrorist or armed
activities directed towards the violent overthrow of the regime of another State, or interfere in civil strife in another
State.
The use of force to deprive peoples of their national identity constitutes a violation of their inalienable rights and of
the principle of non-intervention.
Every State has an inalienable right to choose its political, economic, social and cultural systems, without
interference in any form by another State.
Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as affecting the relevant provisions of the Charter relating to
the maintenance of international peace and security.
..... To this end:
(a) States shall co-operate with other States in the maintenance of international peace and security;
(b) States shall co-operate in the promotion of universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and
fundamental freedoms for all, and in the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination and all forms of religious
intolerance;
(c) States shall conduct their international relations in the economic, social, cultural, technical and trade fields in
accordance with the principles of sovereign equality and non-intervention;
(d) States Members of the United Nations have the duty to take joint and separate action in co-operation with the
United Nations in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter.
States should co-operate in the economic, social and cultural fields as well as in the field of science and technology
and for the promotion of international cultural and educational progress. States should co-operate in the promotion
of economic growth throughout the world, especially that of the developing countries.
25
See, for example, Case of Certain Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v.
United States of America) Merits. I.C.J. Reports 1986, pp.106-109, para.202-207.
26
Meinhard Schoroder, “Principle of Non-intervention” in R. Bernhardt ed. Encyclopedia of Public International
Law, Vol. II, (Elsevier, 1999) p.620.
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general.27
However, there exist exceptions to the principle of non-intervention that can be accepted in
traditional international law.

2.1.1. Types of Interventions
2.1.1.1. U.N. Intervention
In his Agenda for Peace,28 Boutrous Ghali, the former U.N. Secretary General, stated the
strong commitment of the U.N. to achieve the great objectives of the U.N. Charter: U.N.’s
capacity to maintain international peace and security, to secure justice and human rights and to
promote “social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom.”29 Under Article 41, the
Security Council has the power to call for non-military actions, including “complete or partial
interruption of economic relations” in order to prevent any threat to the peace, breach of the
peace or act of aggression under Article 39.30
The U.N. has engaged in resolving regional and national conflicts through direct and indirect
intervention by carrying out various operations including peacekeeping and humanitarian
assistance.31 The U.N. has played an active role in helping countries solve their internal disputes

27

Ibid, p.621.
Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security
Council on 31 January 1992, “An Agenda for Peace, Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping” (17
June 1992) U.N. Doc. A/47/277. S/24111., available at http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agpeace.html
29
U.N. Charter, Preamble.
30
Article 41 of the U.N. Charter:
The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give
effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may
include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and
other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.
See also Nigel White and Ademola Abass, “Countermeasures and Sanctions” in Malcolm D. Evans ed. International
Law, 2nd ed., (Oxford, 2006) pp.509-524.
“The U.N. clearly has the competence to override the domestic jurisdiction limitation in article 2(7) when acting
under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.”
31
See, in general, Website of Security Council Sanctions Committees, http://www.un.org/sc/committees/ See also
28
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in order to facilitate peace agreement.32 The U.N. has also performed an effective role as
mediator in resolving disputes, and preserving peace through its strong commitment. 33 It
indicates that ‘domestic matters’ within a certain state, as well as bilateral and multilateral
concerns between and among states, cannot be isolated from the external intervention of the U.N.
With a mandate to preserve peace, the U.N. is bound to do whatever is necessary and to take
proper measures within the limits of the U.N. Charter.34

2.1.1.2. Unilateral Intervention
While multilateral measures are explicitly provided for by the U.N. Charter, the Charter
does not block unilateral measures to advance its purposes. While Article 2(4) of the U.N.
Charter prohibits unilateral measures involving the use of force, the Charter does not expressly
prohibit unilateral non-military actions such as economic sanctions by U.N. members. 35
However, some states argue that Articles 2(4) and 2(7), together, implicitly ban any non-military
interference including an economic one.36 On the contrary, some eminent legal scholars like
Oppenheim maintain that Article 2(4) is limited to the threat or use of force, and Article 2(7) is
only applied to action by the United Nations, not by the individual member states.37 Presently,

Sarah H. Cleveland, supra note 12, pp.51-52; Myres S. McDougal & W. Michael Riesman, “Rhodesia and the
United Nations: The Lawfulness of International Concern,” 62 Am. J. Int'l L. 1 (1968)
32
Security Council Sanctions Committees, Ibid.
33
Security Council Sanctions Committees, Ibid.
34
See Agenda for Peace, supra note 28.
35
Sarah H. Cleveland, supra note 12, p.51.
36
See, for example, U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/210 (1984) In its 39 session in 1984, the U.N. General Assembly adopted
the resolution under the GATT:
“Developed countries should refrain from threatening or applying trade restrictions, blockades, embargoes and other
economic sanctions, incompatible with the Charter of the United Nations and in violation of undertakings contracted,
multilaterally or bilaterally, against developing countries as a form of political and economic coercion which affects
their economic, political and social development.”
37
Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts, Oppenheim’s International Law, 9th ed., (1992) § 132, pp.447-449.
-8-

no international consensus exists around any of these two positions.38 However, this paper
argues that since unilateral intervention presents many opportunities for abuse,39 this kind of
intervention should be carried out only after due consideration.

2.1.2. Humanitarian Intervention
Humanitarian intervention is based upon the doctrine that there are limits to the freedoms
states have in dealing with their own nationals.40 It should be distinguished from actions to
protect a state’s own nationals abroad.41 When this doctrine was defined by Dutch international
scholar Hugo Grotius and other 17th century legal scholars, it allowed one or more states to use
force to prevent another state from mistreating its own nationals in circumstances so brutal and
widespread that they shocked the conscience of the international community. 42 Such
interference in a state’s domestic affairs is defended by the argument that if certain practices
continue to take place in a state despite protest and objections by neighboring states, then
humanitarian considerations outweigh the prohibition of intervention and justify a decision to
interfere.43 Overall, the arguments for humanitarian intervention can be summarized as follows:
“ultimately, peace is more endangered by tyrannical contempt for human rights than by attempts
to assert, through intervention, the holiness of human personality.”44
In the 19th century, the doctrine of humanitarian intervention was widely abused by states

38

Nigel White and Ademola Abass, supra note 30.
Ibid.
40
Ray August, Public International Law, (Prentice Hall, 1995), pp.251-252.
41
U.K. Foreign Office Policy Document No. 148, 57 BYIL 614 (1986) II.18; Dae-Soon Kim, International Law,
11th ed. (Seoul: Samyoungsa, 2006), pp.1075-1078.
42
Ray August, supra note 40.
43
Gerhard Von Glahn, Law among Nations: an introduction to public international law, 7th ed., (Longman, 1996)
p.582.
44
U.K. Foreign Office Policy Document No. 148, supra note 41, II.20.
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which intervened to advance their own interests.45 For example, in 1860 and 1861 France
occupied parts of Syria and policed its coast by warships based upon the doctrine of
humanitarian intervention in order to stop the massacre of Maronite Christians.46 The motives
behind France’s action, however, have been criticized in the context of the historical record.47
It is hard to reconcile a state’s sovereignty with fundamental human rights48 and there was
little express support from states for the doctrine of humanitarian intervention by individual
states, other than from the U.K.49. The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) also rejects humanitarian
intervention as having no legal basis in the U.N. Charter.50
This paper argues that the time is not yet ripe for recognizing humanitarian intervention as
an established exception to the principle of non-intervention. The reasons are as follows: first,
the U.N. Charter and the current international treaties do not seem to incorporate such a doctrine
specifically. Second, in the last two centuries, and especially since the end of the Second World
War, only very few cases can be considered a genuine humanitarian intervention, if any at all.
Last, the scope for abuse of humanitarian intervention overshadows its usefulness.
However, it is certain that there is increasing international interest in the development of a
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respecting the guiding principles of humanitarian assistance, adopted by the General Assembly in its resolution
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detailed framework for humanitarian intervention51 and that at least in cases like Darfur, there
should be a duty to intervene.

2.1.3. The Nicaragua Case
The 1986 Nicaragua v. the United States case heard by the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) is important in terms of the principle of non-intervention.52 In addition to considering
arguments on the use of force and collective self-defense, the ICJ addressed the international law
relating to intervention and the right of third states to take countermeasures in response to
intervention which does not amount to an armed attack. The ICJ considered the argument that the
U.S. action was a legitimate response to Nicaragua’s action in support of the insurgents in El
Salvador, although Nicaragua’s action did not amount to an armed attack. The Court first defined
the principle of non-intervention as follows:
205... the principle forbids all States or groups of States to intervene directly or indirectly in
internal or external affairs of other States. A prohibited intervention must accordingly be one
bearing on matters in which each State is permitted, by the principle of State sovereignty, to decide
freely. One of these is the choice of a political, economic, social and cultural system, and the
formulation of foreign policy. Intervention is wrongful when it uses methods of coercion in regard
to such choices, which must remain free ones. The element of coercion, which defines, and indeed
forms the very essence of, prohibited intervention, is particularly obvious in the case of an
intervention which uses force, either in the direct form of military action, or in the indirect form of
support for subversive or terrorist armed activities within another State…

53

The ICJ concluded that the principle of non-intervention was established as a matter of
customary international law. The court found that there was no exception in favor of a right to
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intervention to support “an internal opposition in another state, whose cause appears particularly
worthy by reason of the political and moral values with which it was identified.”54 Applying the
principle of non-intervention to the facts of the case, the court concluded that the U.S. support
for “the military and paramilitary activities of the contras in Nicaragua by financial support,
training, supply of weapons, intelligence and logistic support, constitutes a clear breach of the
principle of non-intervention.”55
However, on the issue of the accordance of economic coercion with international law, when
reviewing the U.S. economic coercion toward Nicaragua, the ICJ concluded that it was “unable
to regard such action on the economic plane as is here complained of as a breach of the
customary law principle of non-intervention.”56 Therefore, this paper argues that at this point, it
appears that nothing forbids the use of economic sanctions in customary international law.

2.2. The International Human Rights Law
The international human rights law has been developed through the general treaties,
declarations of international institutions like the United Nations, and customary international
law.57 The issue of human rights has also advanced through conventions, state practices, and the
endeavors of NGOs and private entities.58
54
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2.2.1. Jus Cogens and Obligations Erga Omnes
Normally in classic international law, there is no hierarchy of sources or rules of
international law, at least such as between the two primary laws, custom and treaty.59 However,
since the late 1960s, there has been an argument that “certain norms governing relations between
states should be given a higher rank than ordinary rules deriving from treaties and custom.”60
Finally, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969 (as well as that of 1986) provided,
in Article 53: Treaties Conflicting with a Peremptory Norm of General International Law (Jus
Cogens), the following:
A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general
international law. For the purposes of the present Convention, a peremptory norm of general
international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a
whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a
subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.61

On the other hand, there are certain international obligations that have achieved the position
of customary international law in the sense that they are binding to all states without exception.62
These obligations are defined in two paragraphs from the ICJ judgment in the Barcelona
Traction case in 1970. The complete text of these paragraphs follows below:
33. When a State admits into its territory foreign investments or foreign nationals, whether natural
or juristic persons, it is bound to extend to them the protection of the law and assumes obligations

A state violates international law if, as a matter of state policy, it practices, encourages, or condones
(a) genocide,
(b) slavery or slave trade,
(c) the murder or causing the disappearance of individuals,
(d) torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment,
(e) prolonged arbitrary detention,
(f) systematic racial discrimination, or
(g) a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights.
59
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60
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concerning the treatment to be afforded them. These obligations, however, are neither absolute nor
unqualified. In particular, an essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations of a
State towards the international community as a whole, and those arising vis-a-vis another State in
the field of diplomatic protection. By their very nature the former are the concern of all States. In
view of the importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest in their
protection; they are obligations erga omnes.
34. Such obligations derive, for example, in contemporary international law, from the outlawing of
acts of aggression, and of genocide, as also from the principles and rules concerning the basic
rights of the human person, including protection from slavery and racial discrimination. Some of the
corresponding rights of protection have entered into the body of general international law
(Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 23); others are conferred by international instruments of
a universal or quasi-universal character.63 (emphasis added.)

Similarly, it is widely accepted that fundamental human rights violations no longer belong to
the domestic jurisdiction of individual states. As stated above in regard to the Barcelona
Traction case, the ICJ considered certain “basic rights of the human person” such as protection
from slavery, racial discrimination, or genocide as obligations Erga Omnes. The ICJ judgment
shows that the court has clearly accepted that the obligation to respect fundamental human rights
is an obligation of international law. Professor Antonio Cassese argues that, “the principle on
human rights entitles all members of the international community to demand compliance and, in
case of gross and large-scale infringements, to request their cessation.”64
However, identifying the international human rights that constitute Jus Cogens or
obligations Erga Omnes still remains an open question. At least, prohibition and protection from
slavery, racial discrimination, genocide, and torture are generally accepted by the international
community as basic human rights. Indeed, a consensus has been reached regarding certain core
63
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human rights principles, including the ones above.65

2.2.2. International Human Rights Law and the Limitation on State Sovereignty
As international law has been developed basically from the consent of individual states, it
can be argued that such consent puts certain limits on state sovereignty. Article 24 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, also provides this underlying principle:
1. A treaty enters into force in such manner and upon such date as it may provide or as the
negotiating States may agree.
2. Failing any such provision or agreement, a treaty enters into force as soon as consent to be
bound by the treaty has been established for all the negotiating States.
3. When the consent of a State to be bound by a treaty is established on a date after the treaty has
come into force, the treaty enters into force for that State on that date, unless the treaty otherwise
provides.
4. The provisions of a treaty regulating the authentication of its text, the establishment of the
consent of States to be bound by the treaty, the manner or date of its entry into force, reservations,
the functions of the depositary and other matters arising necessarily before the entry into force of
the treaty apply from the time of the adoption of its text.

The U.N. Charter also imposes certain restrictions on member states’ sovereignty by giving
the Security Council the power to intervene or permit intervention where there is a threat to or
breach of international peace. Article 24 (1) and (2) of the U.N. Charter clearly state this
principle:
1. In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer on the
Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and
agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their
behalf.
2. In discharging these duties the Security Council shall act in accordance with the Purposes and
Principles of the United Nations. The specific powers granted to the Security Council for the
65
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discharge of these duties are laid down in Chapters VI, VII, VIII, and XII.

In the same manner, when states agree to bilateral, multilateral or customary human rights
norms through human rights treaties or customary human rights law, their sovereignty will be
limited by such norms.66
The first effort to protect and promote human rights on a global level was the 1948
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (the Declaration).67 Even though the Declaration has no
legal binding force, the basic human rights principles which are expressed in the Declaration are
generally considered universal. 68 The Declaration itself was the basis of two foundational
international human rights conventions: the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR)69 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)70.
Both covenants successfully transfer the Declaration into a binding treaty law. Based upon the
Declaration, a number of additional treaties which address specific categories of fundamental
human rights have been widely ratified. They are the four Geneva Conventions in Time of War71
and the subsequent 1977 Additional Protocols, 72 the Genocide Convention, 73 the Torture
66
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Convention, 74 the Convention to Eliminate All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 75 the
Convention to Eliminate All Forms of Discrimination against Women,76 and the Convention on
the Rights of the Child.77 Regional agreements that substantially incorporate the core principles
of the Declaration include the European Convention on Human Rights, 78 the American
Convention on Human Rights,79 and the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights.80
These evolving human rights treaties suggest that human rights issues should not be
overlooked and at least, gross violations of human rights are no longer the exclusive concerns of
each individual state’s domestic jurisdiction. Furthermore, they suggest that the protection and
promotion of human rights should be achieved through international law which includes the
principle of state sovereignty.81
It is undeniable that protection of human rights and respect for state sovereignty are both
important items in current international law. The problem is how to protect and promote human
rights without impairing the principle of state sovereignty under the existing international legal
system. That is, whether there is potentiality to limit the principle of state sovereignty used to
protect a state from international responses to its serious violations of obligations under the
12, 1951.
74
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. res. 39/46,
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OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82 doc.6 rev.1 at 25 (1992).
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evolving international human rights law.
The view that sovereign rights of states should be defied in the case of certain human rights
violations because gross human rights violations can give legal grounds for defying the principle
of state sovereignty, has been gaining momentum.82 On the other hand, developing and leastdeveloped countries stress the importance of “the inviolability of national sovereignty, political
independence and territorial integrity” while also admitting “the need for international
cooperation to address problems of massive and systematic violations of human rights.”83
This paper argues that the relationship between human rights and state sovereignty should
and can be complementary.
The protection and promotion of human rights can be enhanced by the respect for a state’s
sovereignty. States should be viewed not as deniers of human rights, but as protectors and
promoters of the human rights of their nationals. Respect for state sovereignty can be realized by
protecting the fundamental rights of a state’s nationals through the national law. In other words,
this paper argues that each individual state has a responsibility to protect and promote the human
rights of its own nationals based upon the principle of sovereignty. State sovereignty and
independence should serve not as a hurdle to, but as a guarantee for the realization of the
fundamental human rights of the state’s nationals. Each individual state, then, should cooperate
with other states in order to carry out their obligations under state sovereignty and international
82
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human rights law.

2.3. Conclusion
It seems that state sovereignty and the protection of human rights are mutually challenged in
international law. The principle of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other states has
been considered as a vital tool in ensuring peace and harmony among states.
However, evolving international human rights law now requires a re-examination of this
principle. Now, an individual state’s domestic concerns frequently pose a serious threat to the
peace and stability of the region and the international community. Admittedly, humanitarian
intervention had been abused in the past by strong states to pursue other political, economic or
military objectives.84 Further, the legitimacy of the right to intervention under the U.N. Charter
is debatable under the well-established principle of non-intervention codified in Article 2(4) and
2(7) of the Charter. This paper, however, believes that to a certain extent, as Sir Hartley
Shawcross confidently declared at the Nuremberg Trials, “[t]he right of humanitarian
intervention on behalf of the rights of man, trampled upon by a state in a manner shocking the
sense of mankind, has long been considered to form part of the recognized law of nations.”85
The concept of human rights today has been expanded and the core human rights are
considered inalienable and legally enforceable. The concept of sovereignty also has been
developed further and one of its main elements is the protection of a state’s nationals’
fundamental rights from state interference and the abuse of power by the government. The
evolvement of international human rights law is one of the most remarkable innovations in

84

Peter Malanczuk, supra note 5, p.221.
The Avalon Project at Yale Law School, Nuremberg Trial Proceedings Volume 3, Tuesday, 4 December 1945,
available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/proc/12-04-45.htm

85

- 19 -

modern international law.86 If gross human rights violations, especially those that rise to the
level of Jus Cogens or obligations Erga Omnes, are not solved by the state itself, they are no
longer the sole problem of this state. Therefore, this paper argues that the fundamental human
rights have risen to a position of ‘universality’ and the international community should accept
this.
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III. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
With increasing frequency since the 1990s, we have been witnessing the gradual emergence
of a modern version of humanitarian intervention in cases of gross human rights violations,
especially through economic sanctions.87 Economic sanctions are generally imposed in two
ways: by the U.N. Security Council and by individual states, mostly the U.S. and the E.U.
countries. This chapter will review the use of economic sanctions first internationally and then
domestically.

3.1. The Use of Economic Sanctions
International economic law is based upon treaties regarding “the reciprocal liberalization of
market access and the protection of economic freedom and private property rights,”88 even
though they are not mentioned in either the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR)89 or the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)90
However, it is clear that international economic law has continued to affect positively the scope
of human rights protection. For example, a post-Uruguay round inventory of potential agenda
items for the world trading system includes such important questions on human rights as
“competition policy, environmental controls and policies, the link between economic sanctions
and human rights, the problems of arms control, and the general question of international
economic sanctions and their relation to world order.”91
Upon reviewing the customary international law concerning economic measures, no
87

Thomas Buergenthal, “The evolving International Human Rights System”, 100 Am. J. Int’l L. 783 (2006) p.790.
Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, “Constitutionalism and International Adjudication: How to constitutionalize the U.N.
Dispute Settlement Sytem?” 31 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 753 (1999) p.771.
89
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 69.
90
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 70.
91
John H. Jackson, “International Economic Law” in R. Bernhardt ed., Encyclopedia of Public International Law,
Vol. II, (ELSEVIER, 1999), p.32.

88

- 21 -

important norms are to be found except those related to expropriations and nationalizations.
However, international norms on human rights have been increasingly incorporated into
discussions and negotiations on economic matters since the end of the Cold War.92
Economic sanctions are “highly controversial foreign policy tools” that have drawn a fair
amount of criticism.93 It is difficult to name a term of public international law, whose definition
is vaguer than that of economic sanction. As stated in Chapter II, this is partly because of the
relationship between economic sanctions and the prohibition of intervention which itself lacks a
clear definition.94 Economic sanctions can be defined as “coercive foreign policy action[s] .....
[that] intentionally suspend customary economic relations such as trade and/or financial
exchanges in order to prompt the targeted state to change its policy or behavior.”95 The U.N.
General Assembly emphasized the principle of non-intervention by economic measures in the
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States of December 12, 1974.96 Economic sanctions
generally center on trade embargoes, financial (loan and transfer) restrictions, and transportation
(land, sea, air) prohibitions, as well as restrictions on arms shipments.97
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3.1.1. Countermeasures
Countermeasures against an offending state for violation of an international law may be
taken by the offended through joint or parallel actions.98 Such actions have generally involved
severance of diplomatic relations, trade boycotts and in some cases, cessation of air or sea
traffic.99 These measures, if not contrary to treaty obligation, fall within the discretion of each
individual state. Where these measures are contrary to treaty obligations or customary
international norms, they may be legally justified as reprisals.100 In certain cases, states which
have not been directly injured can join in collective countermeasures on the basis that the
violation has an impact on “a common concern of the international community.”101 As discussed
in Chapter II, an emphasis on the common concern of states in struggling with such acts as
aggression, terrorism or serious violations of human rights is in accord with the concept of duties
Erga Omnes.
In the past, states could even go to war to enforce their legal rights. However, this is no more
lawful except in certain exceptions like self-defence against armed attack.102 The remaining
forms of self-help are countermeasures like retorsion and reprisals.103 Retorsion is a lawful act
which is meant to punish the violating state by, for example cutting off economic aid.104
Reprisal is an act which would usually be illegal but which is rendered legal by a prior illegal act
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committed by the other state.105 One disadvantage of retorsion and reprisal is that the state
imposing these measures may injure itself as much as the state against which they are
designed.106 Specifically, this can happen when one state cuts off trade with the violating state.
A more serious disadvantage of self-help is that it works effectively only if the injured state is
more powerful than the violating state.107
Therefore, sanctions are increasingly imposed by large groups of states, working through
international organizations such as the U.N. Security Council. However, the U.N. Security
Council has imposed sanctions only in limited circumstances108 because the veto power of the
five permanent members often has paralyzed the imposition of sanctions. Though the U.N.
General Assembly is not subject to the veto, its resolutions are not legally binding. The decisions
of both the Security Council and the General Assembly are generally based upon political
considerations.109
It is undeniable that sanctions work less effectively in international law than in domestic law.
There are more than 190 states and as only few states have strong political and economic power,
the other states are too weak to impose sanctions against them.
This paper, however, argues that this does not mean that international law as a whole works
less effectively than domestic law. International law just works in a different way.110

3.1.2. Legality of Economic Sanctions under the International Law
States targeted by economic sanctions claim that states imposing economic sanctions violate
105
106
107
108
109
110

See Nigel White and Ademola Abass, supra note 30, pp.513-515.
Ibid.
Ibid.
This will be discussed in Chapter III. 2. (Economic Sanctions by the U.N. Security Council) in depth.
Peter Malanczuk, supra note 5, p.4.
Ibid, p.5.
- 24 -

the principle of non-intervention and state sovereignty under the Article 2(7) of the U.N.
Charter.111 That is, economic sanctions intervene with the target state’s domestic jurisdiction
and state sovereignty. However, in 1999 the U.N. issued a report of the Secretary-General
according to which states may use economic sanctions on other states for affirming existing
international norms.
Reaffirming that no State may use or encourage the use of economic, political or any other type of
measures to coerce another State in order to obtain from it the subordination of the exercise of its
sovereign rights,
1. Calls upon the international community to adopt urgent and effective measures to eliminate the
use by some developed countries of unilateral economic coercive measures against developing
countries that are not authorized by relevant organs of the United Nations or are inconsistent with
the principles contained in the Charter of the United Nations, as a means of forcibly imposing the
112

will of one State on another;”

By analogy, in other circumstances, especially when it is a matter of upholding concrete
international principles, economic sanctions may be allowed under the international law.
Similarly, in 1984 the U.N. General Assembly adopted a resolution on Economic Measures
as a Means of Political and Economic Coercion Against Developing Countries.
2. Reaffirms that developed countries should refrain from threatening or applying trade restrictions,
blockades, embargoes and other economic sanctions, incompatible with the provisions of the
Charter of the United Nations and in violation of undertakings contracted multilaterally or
bilaterally, against developing countries as a form of political and economic coercion which affects
their economic, political and social development;113

This resolution should also be interpreted to mean that the individual state’s use of economic
sanctions may not be a violation against the U.N. Charter automatically, while certain sanctions
111
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which meet the conditions of the resolution should be considered illegal under international
law.114
Furthermore, there are no clear customary international norms against the use of economic
sanctions, even if economic sanctions may be considered an intervention into another state’s
sovereignty.115 The end of the Cold War has allowed the Security Council to use economic
sanctions more widely ever since the 1990s.116 Because of the firm principle of prohibition of
use of force under the U.N. Charter, individual states have used various forms of economic
sanctions to settle disputes.117 The International Court of Justice (ICJ) also found that economic
sanctions do not violate the customary international norm of non-intervention.118
Overall, the international community has been increasingly willing to recognize gross
human rights violations as a matter which threatens regional and international peace and to
endorse economic sanctions and sometimes even military interventions, in places like Somalia,
Rwanda, Bosnia, Haiti, Kosovo, East Timor, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, the
Sudan, and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). In light of the increasing use of
economic sanctions, this paper argues that the use of economic sanctions has become an
accepted customary international norm.119
As discussed in Chapter II, one of the most significant developments in international law in
the last decades has been the wide recognition of human rights. Gross human rights violations
have been increasingly accepted as matters of international concern that warrant multilateral and
sometimes unilateral intervention by states. Therefore, this paper maintains that economic
114
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sanctions against human rights violations are fully consistent with international law including the
U.N. Charter to protect and promote fundamental human rights.

3.2. Economic Sanctions by the U.N. Security Council
When the U.N. Security Council decides that there is “the existence of any threat to the
peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression,” its actions fall in one of following categories.120
It may call upon the member states to apply “measures not involving the use of armed forces”
like the closure of economic relations or the severance of diplomatic relations,121 or may call for
the use of armed forces which is “necessary to maintain or restore international peace and
security.”122 Several cases of economic sanctions by the Security Council, applied, at least
partially, for human rights violations, are discussed below.

3.2.1. Sanctions against Southern Rhodesia
The first major instance of economic sanctions specifically or at least ostensibly in an effort
to vindicate human rights was the case of Southern Rhodesia. The U.N. Security Council
authorized sanctions against Rhodesia for the first time in 1965; 123 they lasted until the
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restoration of British rule in December 1979.124 It was mainly against the Unilateral Declaration
of Independence (UDI) by the white minority government of the Southern Rhodesia territory in
1965.125 Based upon the two resolutions in 1965,126 the Security Council called on member
states of the U.N. not to recognize or assist the illegal regime and in particular to break all
economic and arms relations with it. In 1966127 and 1968,128 the Security Council went further
by imposing selective mandatory economic sanctions on Rhodesia. However, the sanctions were
not universally adhered to. South Africa, Portugal, Israel, Iran and some Arab states helped
Rhodesia in various ways. In 1970, 129 1972, 130 and 1973, 131 finally the Security Council
rendered comprehensive economic sanctions. They were terminated in 1979 as a result of the
agreement leading to the independence of Zimbabwe. 132 The white minority government
consented in the agreement mainly out of economic concern, namely, they needed to preserve
their economic stability and capital from sanctions.

3.2.2. Sanctions against Iraq
The sanctions against Iraq were one of the most comprehensive ranges of economic
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sanctions imposed by the Security Council. They were adopted in the wake of Iraq’s invasion of
Kuwait (the Gulf War) in 1990.133 Based upon Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, Security
Council Resolution 661 affirmed the inherent right of individual and collective self-defence and
also expressed concern about further loss of human life.134 This resolution imposed a wide range
of economic sanctions on Iraq, including the prohibition of all imports from and exports to Iraq
and the occupied Kuwait, and the transfer of funds to Iraq and Kuwait.135 Furthermore, the
Security Council decided that “all states shall not make available to the government of Iraq or to
any commercial, industrial or public utility undertaking in Iraq or Kuwait, any funds or any other
financial or economic resources and shall prevent their nationals and any persons within their
territories.....from remitting any other funds to persons or bodies within Iraq or Kuwait.....”136
Subsequently, the Security Council established a committee composed of all members of the
Council to control the implementation of economic sanctions under Security Council Resolution
666.137 The committee was instructed to keep the situation regarding food in Iraq and Kuwait
under constant review.138 This committee was also directed to remember that food supplies
should be supported through the U.N. in cooperation with the International Committee of the
Red Cross or other appropriate humanitarian agencies and distributed by them or under their
supervision.139
Condemning the gross human rights violation by Iraq, for example, “the treatment by Iraqi
forces of Kuwait nationals, including measures to force them to leave their own country and
mistreatment of persons and property.....[and] its holding of third-state nationals against their
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
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will,” Security Council Resolution 670140 tightened the binding economic sanctions imposed on
Iraq. Through this Resolution, the Council decided that all states, irrespective of any
international agreements or contracts, licenses or permits in existence, were to refuse permission
to any aircraft to take off from their territory, if the aircraft was carrying cargo to or from Iraq or
Kuwait.141 In addition, states were to refuse permission to any aircraft destined to land in Iraq or
Kuwait to overfly their territory.142
After the end of the 1991 Gulf War, these economic sanctions against Iraq were linked to the
removal of the weapons of mass destruction by Security Council Resolution 687.143 Based upon
this Resolution, Iraq was called upon to accept the destruction or removal of all chemical and
biological weapons and all ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometers.144
Since the Council did not lift the sanctions, they were increasingly criticized for inflicting
humanitarian suffering on innocent civilians, lack of clear criteria for termination, and the failure
to put direct pressure on Iraq's leader. 145 In response to the criticism for the sanctions’
humanitarian impact, several Security Council resolutions were introduced that allowed the sale
of Iraqi oil in exchange for food and medicine. The earliest of these resolutions were introduced
in 1991. Security Council Resolution 706 was adopted to allow the sale of Iraqi oil in exchange
for food and medicine.146 Security Council Resolution 712 confirmed that Iraq could sell oil to
fund a U.N. “Oil-for-Food Program.”147 In 1995, under Security Council Resolution 986, Iraq
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was allowed to export more oil with which to purchase items needed to sustain the civilian
population.148 The first Iraqi oil under “the Oil-for-Food Program” was exported in December
1996 and the first shipments of food arrived in March 1997.149 The sanctions were finally lifted
on May 22, 2003 by Security Council Resolution 1483.150 Overall, sanctions on Iraq were
proven unsuccessful because they were neither designed for immediate implementation nor wellplanned with a more long term approach. Furthermore, the role of various agencies in the
implementation and monitoring of the sanctions were unclear.

3.2.3. Sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
Under Security Council Resolution 757, the Council imposed a wide range of economic
sanctions on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) on May, 1992.151
These sanctions are also related to the protection of human rights as the Council announced its
concern for the continued expulsion of non-Serb civilians152 and noted the “urgent need for
humanitarian assistance and the various appeals made in this connection” under the former
Resolution 752.153
Resolution 757 prohibited the import of goods from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and
the export or trans-shipment of such goods by states or their nationals and the sale or supply of
any commodities or products to any person or body in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia or to
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any person or body for the purposes of any business carried on in or operated from it.154 This
resolution also prohibited all states from making available to the authorities in the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia or to any commercial, industrial or public utility undertaking there, any
funds or any other financial or economic resources.155 In addition, it posited that all states should
prevent their nationals and any persons within their territories from providing any funds or
resource at all to anyone within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, except for payments
exclusively for strictly medical or humanitarian purposes and foodstuffs.156
The sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia were tightened under Security
Council Resolution 787.157 Through this resolution, the Council decided that “any vessel in
which a majority or a controlling interest was held by a person or undertaking in or operating
from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia shall be considered, for the purpose of implementation
of the relevant resolutions of the Security Council, a vessel of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia regardless of the flag under which the vessel sails.”158 Extensive maritime control
measures were also adopted under this resolution.
The scope of these sanctions was extended by Security Council Resolution 820159 on the
U.N. protected areas in the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
under the control of Bosnian Serb forces.160 Security Council Resolution 942161 extended the
sanctions to include “economic activities carried on within their territories by any entity which is
owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by any person or any entity in those areas of the
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Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the control of Bosnian Serb forces.”162
As peace negotiations progressed, the sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
were gradually eased. After the Dayton Peace Agreement was initiated, most sanctions were
suspended indefinitely by Security Council Resolution 1022,163 except for the measures imposed
on the Bosnian Serb forces.164 This resolution also released the frozen assets with the decision
that “all funds and assets previously frozen or impounded pursuant to resolutions 757 (1992) and
820 (1993) may be released by States in accordance with law, provided that any such funds and
assets that are subject to any claims, liens, judgments, or encumbrances, or which are the funds
or assets of any person, partnership, corporation, or other entity found or deemed insolvent under
law or the accounting principles prevailing in such State, shall remain frozen or impounded until
released in accordance with applicable law, and decides further that obligations of States.”165 All
sanctions were fully lifted by Security Council Resolution 1074166 after the elections in Bosnia
and Herzegovina which satisfied the requirements of the Peace Agreement.167 Overall, sanctions
played significant role to establish the Peace Agreement because they were well designed and
applied limited measures with understanding the requirements for effective enforcement.

3.2.4. Sanctions against Somalia
Concerned about “the rapid deterioration of the situation in Somalia and the heavy loss of
human life and widespread material damage resulting from the conflict in the country,” under
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, the Security Council first imposed a general and complete arms
162
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embargo on Somalia in 1992 with the adoption of Resolution 733.168 It demanded that all states
implement immediately a general and complete arms embargo on all deliveries of weapons and
military equipment to Somalia.169
With time, the Council adopted certain exceptions to the arms embargo to meet the changes
of the political and economic situation in Somalia.
Under Resolution 1356,170 protective clothing for humanitarian and development workers
and non-lethal military equipment solely for humanitarian or protective use were excluded from
the arms embargo.171 In 2006, through Resolution 1726,172 weapons and military equipment and
technical training and assistance intended solely for the support of or use by the force of ‘the
Transitional Federal Institutions’ of Somalia became exceptions to the arms embargo, as well.173
Overall, in Somalia, sanctions did not contribute to pressure the parties to negotiate a
peaceful agreement or to constrain the military capabilities of the rebel movements, because of
the useless monitoring system and enforcement procedures, namely applying ineffective arms
embargoes without providing meaningful solutions.

3.2.5. Sanctions against Rwanda
The Security Council resolution concerning Rwanda is one of the distinct examples of
economic sanctions against gross human rights violations. In Resolution 918,174 the Council
strongly condemned the genocide which took place in Rwanda and the impunity of armed
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individuals. The Council was also concerned that “the situation in Rwanda, which has resulted in
the death of many thousands of innocent civilians, including women and children, the internal
displacement of a significant percentage of the Rwandan population, and the massive exodus of
refugees to neighbouring countries, constitutes a humanitarian crisis of enormous proportions.”
As a result, under this resolution, a complete arms embargo on Rwanda was imposed by the
Security Council.175 It terminated on September 1996, pursuant to paragraph 8 of Resolution
1011.176 However, in this resolution, the Security Council prohibits the sale or supply of all
types of arms and related materials to Rwanda, other than to the government of Rwanda.177 It
also prevents the sale or supply of any arms to persons in the neighboring states of Rwanda for
the purpose of the use of such arms or related materials within Rwanda.178 These exceptional
measures are still in effect because of the concern that anti-government forces might use such
arms or related materials.179

3.2.6. Sanctions against Sierra Leone
Deeply concerned about the continued violence, the loss of life and the aggravated human
rights conditions in Sierra Leone following the military coup on 25 May 1997, the Security
175
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Council has issued several resolutions since the adoption of Resolution 1132180 in 1997. The
economic sanctions, including an arms embargo on non-state actors and a travel ban are still in
effect in Sierra Leone.
Security Council Resolution 1171 is the most notable one in this respect. In paragraphs 2, 4,
and 5, the Council prohibited all states from the sale and supply of all types of arms or related
materials to Sierra Leone except to the government of Sierra Leone, and from allowing the entry
into or transit through their territories of leading members of the former military junta and of the
Revolutionary United Front (RUF).181
In Resolution 1171, the Security Council also indicated that all sanctions will expire “once
the control of the Government of Sierra Leone has been fully re-established over all its territory,
and when all non-governmental forces have been disarmed and demobilized.”182
However, the sanctions on the import of all rough diamonds from Sierra Leone, imposed by
Resolution 1306183 and renewed by Resolution 1446184, were terminated in 2003 by the decision
of the Security Council.185 This was the result of the increasing efforts of the government of
Sierra Leone to control and manage its diamond industry and to ensure proper control over
diamond mining areas.186

3.2.7. Sanctions against Liberia
To establish peace and stability in Liberia and its regions, the Security Council has adopted
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several resolutions to impose sanctions since 1995. These include Security Council Resolution
985 187 from 1995 and Security Council Resolution 1343 188 from 2001. The most recent
sanctions are based upon Resolution 1521189 from 2003. The sanctions have been modified by
subsequent resolutions like Security Council Resolutions 1532190 and 1683.191 In 2006, the
Security Council extended the sanctions against Liberia by Resolution 1731.192
The sanctions include an arm embargo, a travel ban, and an assets freeze. Concerning the
arms embargo, the Security Council decided that “all States shall take the necessary measures to
prevent the supply to Liberia of arms and related materiel of all types and also of technical
training and assistance.”193 Concerning the travel ban, the Council prevented all States from the
entry into or transit through their territories of individuals on the Travel Ban List.194 Lastly,
concerning the assets freeze, the Council decided that “all States shall freeze without delay funds,
other financial assets and economic resources owned or controlled by individuals and entities”
on the Assets Freeze List.195 The Travel Ban List and the Assets Freeze List are maintained and
regularly updated by the Security Council.196
With time, some of the items in the sanctions were excluded. In 2006, the Security Council
decided to allow the timber sanctions197 to expire based upon the government of Liberia’s
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commitment to transparent management of the country’s forestry resources.198 In 2007, the
Security Council decided to terminate the diamond sanctions199 under Resolution 1753.200

3.2.8. Sanctions against the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)
To establish peace in the DRC and prevent the illegal exploitation of natural resources from
financing armed groups in the Eastern part of the DRC, the Security Council has adopted several
resolutions since 2003.
The Council first imposed an arms embargo on “all foreign and Congolese armed groups
and militias operating in the territory of North and South Kivu and Ituri, and on groups not party
to the Global and All-inclusive agreement in the Democratic Republic of the Congo” with the
adoption of Resolution 1493201 in 2003.
The sanctions were modified and strengthened with the successive adoption of Resolutions
1533,202 1596,203 1649,204 and 1698.205 Under these resolutions, the Security Council expanded
the scope of the arms embargo and imposed additional sanctions, including a travel ban and an
assets freeze. The U.N. Security Council Sanctions Committee which was established based
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upon Resolution 1533206 maintains and regularly updates both the Travel Ban List and the
Assets Freeze List.207

3.2.9. Sanctions against Côte d’Ivoire
Deeply concerned about the human rights situation in Côte d’Ivoire, “in particular in the
northern part of the country, and [about] the use of the media, in particular radio and television
broadcasts, to incite hatred and violence against foreigners in Côte d’Ivoire,” in 2004 the
Security Council imposed sanctions against Côte d’Ivoire under Resolution 1572. 208 The
sanctions include an arms embargo, 209 a travel ban, 210 an assets freeze, 211 and diamond
sanctions.212
The Security Council has modified and renewed the sanctions by subsequent resolutions like
Resolutions 1584213 and 1643.214 Most recently, the Council extended the sanctions under
Resolution 1727215 from 2006. The Security Council is scheduled to review the sanctions in
light of the progress achieved in the peace and national reconciliation process in Côte d’Ivoire by
31 October 2007.216
Based upon paragraph 8 of Resolution 1572, the arms embargo does not apply to supplies
and technical assistance for the support of or use by the United Nations Operation in Côte
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d'Ivoire (UNOCI) and the French forces,217 as well as to supplies of protective clothing exported
to Côte d’Ivoire by UN personnel, media representatives, humanitarian and development
workers, for their personal use.218
In addition, in paragraph 12 of Resolution 1727, the Security Council emphasized that it is
fully prepared to impose targeted measures against persons who are responsible for serious
violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, for inciting public hatred and
violating the arms embargo, as well as for attacking or obstructing the actions of UNOCI, the
French forces, the High Representative for the Elections, the International Working Group, or the
Mediators.219

3.2.10. Sanctions against the Sudan
The most recent case of the Security Council imposing economic sanctions against gross
human rights violations is the one against the Sudan.
By imposing sanctions, including an arms embargo on all non-governmental entities and
individuals, including the Janjaweed militias, under Resolution 1556 in 2004, the Security
Council clearly showed its concern. It justified its actions against human rights violation as
follows:
Reiterating its grave concern at the ongoing humanitarian crisis and widespread human rights
violations, including continued attacks on civilians that are placing the lives of hundreds of
thousands at risk,
Condemning all acts of violence and violations of human rights and international humanitarian
law by all parties to the crisis, in particular by the Janjaweed, including indiscriminate attacks on
civilians, rapes, forced displacements, and acts of violence especially those with an ethnic
217
218
219
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dimension, and expressing its utmost concern at the consequences of the conflict in Darfur on the
civilian population, including women, children, internally displaced persons, and refugees,
Recalling in this regard that the Government of Sudan bears the primary responsibility to respect
human rights while maintaining law and order and protecting its population within its territory and
that all parties are obliged to respect international humanitarian law,
Urging all the parties to take the necessary steps to prevent and put an end to violations of human
rights and international humanitarian law and underlining that there will be no impunity for
violators,
Expressing its determination to do everything possible to halt a humanitarian catastrophe,
including by taking further action if required…220 (emphasis added)

The sanctions were modified and strengthened with the adoption of Resolution 1591221 in
2005, which expanded the scope of the arms embargo222 and imposed additional measures
including a travel ban223 and an assets freeze224 on individuals designated by the Security
Council Sanctions Committee.
However, the list of individuals who are subject to the sanctions imposed by these
resolutions is too limited. Currently, there are only four persons listed.225
The Security Council clearly expressed its intention to consider taking strong and effective
measures against “any individual or group that violates or attempts to block the implementation
of the Darfur Peace Agreement” in paragraph 1 of Resolution 1679,226 though any further
measures have not been enforced yet.
Human Rights Watch has also asked the Security Council, especially China, to seriously
consider “the important step of supporting through the UN the imposition of targeted sanctions
220
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on key Sudanese officials responsible for Darfur policy.”227

3.2.11. Effects of the U.N. Security Council Economic Sanctions
All ten cases discussed above were provided as samples to illustrate the idea that the
Security Council economic sanctions bolster fundamental human rights. In each case, it was
quite clear that the sanctions mentioned in the text of the resolutions are against the gross human
rights violations codified in international law including the U.N. Charter. If all Security Council
resolutions which imposed the sanctions against human rights violations were examined, they
would also support this conclusion.
Therefore, this paper argues that the sanctions by the Security Council have at least some
positive effects on international human rights law and that they build international human rights
norms.
However, it is also undeniable that for many years, the Security Council, while having the
power under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter to adopt legally binding resolutions and to order
enforcement measures including economic sanctions, has rarely agreed to take such measures in
the past. That situation changed to a large extent with the end of the Cold War. As discussed
above, with increasing frequency, the Security Council has since exercised its powers under
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter in cases of gross human rights violations.
This development has led to the growing willingness of the international community and

227

See Human Rights Watch, “Letter to China on the Crisis in Darfur” available at
http://hrw.org/english/docs/2007/01/29/sudan15189.htm
“.....China has recently publicly supported sanctions against Iran and imposed lesser restrictions on North Korea for
their nuclear activities. The crisis in Sudan is no less critical, either for its victims in Darfur or for the millions of
civilians living in the region who now face threats to their lives and livelihoods because of the regional instability
caused by Darfur’s conflict. Millions of civilians face this nightmare because of the Sudanese government’s policies
of supporting abusive armed groups both within Sudan and across Sudan’s borders. China can demonstrate its
support for regional peace and security by publicly calling for an end to abusive domestic and foreign policies.”
- 42 -

individual states to deal with gross human rights violations by one effective tool of modern
international law, economic sanctions.

3.3. Economic Sanctions by the U.S.
The United States has applied economic sanctions against target countries for various
purposes. To protect and promote human rights, the United States imposed economic sanctions
against China after the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989. 228 In 2007, President Bush
announced that the U.S. government was ready to impose sanctions, including economic ones,
against the Sudan for failing to cooperate with international efforts to end what he described as
the "genocide" in the Darfur region. However, the U.S. postponed its sanctions to give the U.N.
Secretary General time to seek diplomatic solutions to the crisis.229
In response to various nationalization movements, the U.S. has actively applied economic
sanctions since the 1950s.230 By 1976, the U.S. had imposed such sanctions on Brazil, Chile,
Cuba, Ethiopia, and Iran.231
To keep the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), especially nuclear
weapons, the U.S. imposed numerous sanctions including economic measures on countries
attempting to acquire WMD and related materials.232 Most notably, the U.S. applied financial
measures on North Korea to prevent the construction of a nuclear fuel reprocessing plant without

228

See Robert P. O'Quinn, “A User's Guide To Economic Sanctions,” The Heritage Foundation (1997) available at
http://www.heritage.org/Research/PoliticalPhilosophy/BG1126.cfm
229
See Michael Abramowitz and Glenn Kessler, “Bush Unveils and Delays Sanctions for Sudan: Deferral Made
Upon U.N. Chief's Request” Washington Post, Apr. 19. 2007, at A23.
230
See Adam Smith, “A High Price to Pay: The Costs of the U.S. Economic Sanctions Policy and the Need for
Process Oriented Reform,” 4 U.C.L.A. J. Int'l L & For. Aff. 325, (1999) p.333 n.26.
231
Ibid.
232
Ibid.
- 43 -

the supervision of IAEA.233 In addition, the U.S. imposed restrictions on shipments of nuclear
fuel to Argentina, Brazil, India, Pakistan, South Africa, and Taiwan throughout the 1970s and
1980s.234
The U.S. has used economic sanctions to protect the environment, as well. In the 1990s, the
U.S. government included environmental conservation in its list of foreign policy priorities by
including environmental protection in the definition of national security.235 As a result, the U.S.
has enacted various sanctions, including economic measures that prohibit Ex-Im Bank export
financing on products to be used in the construction of China's controversial Three Gorges Dam
Project, or measures that prohibit the import of shrimp from countries that fail to protect sea
turtle in their shrimp nets.236 The U.S. has also banned the importation of various fish and
wildlife from Taiwan.237
Lastly, to prevent terrorism, since the early 1980s the U.S. has imposed sanctions on
countries that are suspected of having terror links. For example, in the case of Libya, the U.S.
banned imports of Libyan oil and a number of exports to Libya, following the deterioration in bilateral relations in 1982. In 1992, after the bombing of the Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie,
the U.S. government imposed unilateral sanctions on Lybia. It lifted most of its economic
sanctions and restored its diplomatic ties after Libya publicly turned its back on weapons of mass
destruction. However, Libya still remains on the list of state sponsors of terrorism and as a result,
arms exports are still banned by the U.S. government.238
There are broadly three rationales underpinning economic sanctions for the achievement of
233
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these purposes.239 First, imposing economic sanctions seeks to influence a targeted state to
change its policies or even its government actions.240 Second, it publicly expresses an opposition
against the targeted state’s policies to the people in the targeted state as well as the international
community including other potential target states.241 Third, it aims to punish the targeted state
for its policies.242
Generally, the U.S. can impose economic sanctions on other countries on the following three
grounds. First, under the federal statutes or executive orders by the President, the Executive can
have the power to impose economic sanctions.243 Second, the Legislative can impose sanctions
by legislation. 244 Third, following a U.N. Security Council resolution, the U.S. can take
sanctions including economic measures to meet the requirements of the resolution.245

3.3.1. U.S. Statutes on Sanctions against Human Rights Violations
The U.S. Congress has adopted a number of statutes in an effort to assimilate U.S. foreign
policy into the protection and promotion of international human rights norms.246 The most
notable federal statute which became the foundation of these legislative efforts is Section 502B
of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961.247 It states:
(1) The United States shall, in accordance with its international obligations as set forth in the
Charter of the United Nations and in keeping with the constitutional heritage and traditions of the
United States, promote and encourage increased respect for human rights and fundamental
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freedoms throughout the world without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.
Accordingly, a principal goal of the foreign policy of the United States shall be to promote the
increased observance of internationally recognized human rights by all countries.248
(2) ..... [n]o security assistance may be provided to any country the government of which engages in
a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights.249

Concerning development assistance, the U.S. implemented this policy under Section 116 of
FAA of 1961:250
(a) Violations barring assistance; assistance for needy people
No assistance may be provided ..... [t]o the government of any country which engages in a
consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights, including torture
or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, prolonged detention without charges,
causing the disappearance of persons by the abduction and clandestine detention of those persons,
or other flagrant denial of the right to life, liberty, and the security of person, unless such assistance
will directly benefit the needy people in such country.251

Section 502 of the Trade Act of 1974252 also authorized the withholding of development
assistance and trade benefits from states violating the following policy:
(c) Factors affecting country designation
In determining whether to designate any country as a beneficiary developing country under this
subchapter, the President shall take into account:
(7) whether or not such country has taken or is taking steps to afford to workers in that country
(including any designated zone in that country) internationally recognized worker rights.253

Section 701 of the International Financial Institutions Act of 1977254 was adopted to direct
the U.S. government to use its “voice and vote” in numerous international financial institutions
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including the International Monetary Fund (IMF) pursuant to the policy as stated below:
(a) Policy goals
The United States Government, in connection with its voice and vote in the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development, the International Development Association, the International
Finance Corporation, the Inter-American Development Bank, the African Development Fund, the
Asian Development Bank, the African Development Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction
and Development, and the International Monetary Fund, shall advance the cause of human rights,
including by seeking to channel assistance toward countries other than those whose governments
engage in:
(1) a pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights, such as torture or cruel,
inhumane, or degrading treatment or punishment, prolonged detention without charges, or other
flagrant denial to life, liberty, and the security of person; or
(2) provide refuge to individuals committing acts of international terrorism by hijacking aircraft.255

While the human rights protected by U.S. sanctions vary from statute to statute, these rights
are generally in accord with the fundamental human rights recognized by international law.256
Therefore, Section 116 of the FAA of 1961,257 one of the foundational statutes preventing
development assistance to states with human rights violations, defines recognized human rights
as follows:
.....torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, prolonged detention without
charges, causing the disappearance of persons by the abduction and clandestine detention of those
persons, or other flagrant denial of the right to life, liberty, and the security of person.....258

In 1990, this act was amended in paragraph (b) to protect the rights of children from
exploitation. It states:
(b) Protection of children from exploitation
No assistance may be provided to any government failing to take appropriate and adequate
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measures, within their means, to protect children from exploitation, abuse or forced conscription
into military or paramilitary services.259

In addition, in 1998, this Act was amended in paragraph (c) to protect the right of religious
freedom, as well:
(c) Factors considered
In determining whether or not a government falls within the provisions of subsection (a) of this
section..... the Administrator shall consider.....
3) whether the government
(A) has engaged in or tolerated particularly severe violations of religious freedom, as defined in
section 6402260 of this title;261

Though the listed rights in Section 116 of FAA did not explicitly include such generally
recognized Jus Cogens norms as genocide or crimes against humanity, it seems that the U.S.
Congress did not intend to exclude them.262
It is very difficult to compile and categorize all U.S. statutes and regulations including
annexed options for imposing economic sanctions against gross human rights violations.
However, this paper believes that the U.S. has made an effort to adopt and amend a series of
statutes that incorporate the protection of international human rights into U.S. foreign policy
including imposing economic sanctions. The followings are cases of economic sanctions by the
U.S. government at least partially imposed for human rights violations.
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3.3.2. Sanctions against Poland
In December 1981, the Polish government declared martial law, under which the army and
the special police arrested or detained all Solidarity Labor Union leaders and many affiliated
intellectuals.263 The United States and other Western countries responded to the martial law by
imposing economic sanctions against the Polish government.
President Ronald Reagan stated that the purpose of imposing economic sanction is to
persuade the Polish leaders to “free those in arbitrary detention, to lift martial law, and to restore
the internationally recognized rights of the Polish people to free speech and association.”264
Though it was not mentioned in the U.S. sanctions legislation, the Polish government also
violated the fundamental economic rights of the Polish people “to form free trade unions and to
strike” by the illegalization of the Solidarity Labor Union.265
These human rights are in accordance with the rights protected by international human rights
law. For example, Article 9 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR)266 states: “No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention.” Article 22 of
ICCPR states: “Everyone shall have the right to freedom of association with others, including the
right to form and join trade unions for the protection of his interests.”
Overall, these economic sanctions against Poland reinforced international human rights
norms. Based upon the sanctions, the U.S. government denied providing 765 million dollars in
agricultural assistance to Poland and also withdrew its most-favored-nation status.267 It was a
tough sanction considering the fact that the Polish foreign debt was more than $20 billion in
263

Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, “Background Note: Poland” U.S. Department of State (Mar. 2007)
available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2875.htm#foreign
264
Ronald Reagan, “Address to the Nation About Christmas and the Situation in Poland” (Dec. 23, 1981) available
at http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1981/122381e.htm
265
Ibid.
266
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 69.
267
Background Note: Poland, supra note 263.
- 49 -

1980.268 However, these sanctions were gradually terminated in return for various positive steps
by the Polish government from the release of political prisoners to the formal abolition of martial
law in 1981.269

3.3.3. Sanctions against South Africa
In 1985 the administration of Ronald Reagan imposed limited sanctions against South
Africa for its government’s racial restrictions and apartheid. 270 In 1986, Congress, after
overriding a presidential veto, imposed more comprehensive economic sanctions to ban the
import of South African goods and investments in South Africa271 through the Comprehensive
Anti-Apartheid Act (CAAA) of 1986.272 Under Section 311 of the CAAA, the U.S. stipulated
the conditions for termination of the sanctions as follows:
(a) This title and sections ..... shall terminate if the Government of South Africa:
(1) releases all persons persecuted for their political beliefs or detained unduly without trial and
Nelson Mandela from prison;
(2) repeals the state of emergency in effect on the date of enactment of this Act and releases all
detainees held under such state of emergency;
(3) unbans democratic political parties and permits the free exercise by South Africans of all races
of the right to form political parties, express political opinions, and otherwise participate in the
political process;
(4) repeals the Group Areas Act and the Population Registration Act and institutes no other
measures with the same purposes; and
(5) agrees to enter into good faith negotiations with truly representative members of the black
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273

majority without preconditions.

The release of all political prisoners and those detained without trial is addressed mainly in
Article 9 of the ICCPR.274 The right to express political opinions is found in Article 19(2) of the
ICCPR.275 The repeal of all discriminatory measures is in Article 2(1) of the ICCPR.276 Overall,
the rights protected by this Act through the imposition of sanctions against South Africa
correspond to the international human rights norms.
The effects of economic sanctions are, however, subject to criticism. The sanctions against
South Africa allegedly caused the loss of more than 100,000 jobs.277 Economic sanctions are
also criticized for pushing “already vulnerable populations..... over the edge into deeper
suffering.”278 Despite some criticisms, economic sanctions remained firmly in place.
In 1990, Nelson Mandela was, finally, released after twenty-seven years of imprisonment,
and the South African government amended most of the apartheid laws and extended political
rights to black people. The U.S. government lifted the economic sanctions, concluding that South
Africa has met the five conditions in the CAAA279 and the purpose of the sanctions was
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successfully accomplished.280

3.3.4. Sanctions against Iraq
On August 2, 1990, the U.S. enacted the Iraq Sanctions Act (ISA) of 1990 to impose
economic sanctions on Iraq, including a comprehensive trade ban and a prohibition of financial
relationships with the country for its invasion of Kuwait.281 As discussed in Chapter III.2.B., the
U.N. also imposed economic sanctions against Iraq under Security Council Resolution 661
calling upon all member states to take trade and financial sanctions against Iraq.282 The U.S. and
the U.N. sanctions shared the same objective.
Furthermore, through the ISA, the U.S. emphasized its purpose to protect human rights by
stipulating that the U.S. Congress “condemns the brutal occupation of Kuwait by Iraq and its
gross violations of internationally recognized human rights in Kuwait, including widespread
arrests, torture, summary executions, and mass extrajudicial killings.”283
Prohibition of torture is found not only in the Torture Convention284 but also in Article 7 of
the ICCPR.285 The summary executions and mass extrajudicial killings are addressed in Articles
6(1) 286 and 14(1) 287 of the ICCPR. Overall, the rights protected by this act through the
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imposition of sanctions against Iraq correspond to the international human rights norms.
The U.S. sanctions against Iraq have been widely criticized for “their disproportions impact
on the Iraqi population at large.”288 While there were many reports and warnings about lack of
food and medicine, economic sanctions remained firmly in place.289 Finally, after the Iraq War
in 2003 (the second Gulf War) with the subversion of the Iraqi government of Saddam Hussein,
the U.S. lifted its sanctions against Iraq.

3.3.5. Sanctions against Haiti
In 1990, Haiti held its first free and fair elections in its history.290 However, in 1991, a
military coup ousted the constitutional government. 291 The U.S. government called for a
restoration of democracy with the support of the Organization of American States (OAS). And
the U.S. imposed economic sanctions including a trade embargo on all goods except food and
medicine.292 The aim of the sanctions was “to put pressure on the leaders of the coup and to
deter any other coups from taking place.”293
After the U.S. presidential election, the U.S. government strengthened the sanctions to
further pressure the Haitian military government to step down and to protect the human rights of
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the Haitians including the return of refugees to Haiti.294 The Haitian military government
“unleashed a campaign of terror and repression.....including extrajudicial execution,
disappearances, torture, rape, limitations on freedom of association and assembly, and disruption
in personal and professional activities.”295
The majority of the named offenses clearly implicate fundamental human rights codified in
international human rights law, and concern for international human rights became an impetus
for the U.S. government to impose sanctions against Haiti.
In 1994, the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 940, which authorized the use of “all
necessary means” to remove the military government and to restore Haiti's constitutionally
elected government to power.296 With this resolution the Council expressed its grave concerns
about “the significant further deterioration of the humanitarian situation in Haiti, in particular the
continuing escalation by the illegal de facto regime of systematic violations of civil liberties.”297
While a multinational force (MNF) led by the U.S. prepared to enter Haiti based upon
Security Council Resolution 940, the rule of the military government ended and the
constitutional government restored its power.298 President Aristide and other elected officials in
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exile returned on October 15 1994, and all the sanctions were lifted after that.299
During the time when the sanctions were in effect, the U.S. maintained its humanitarian
assistance by funding non-governmental organizations in Haiti to ease the growing pains of the
Haitian people due to the shortage of food and medical supplies.300

3.3.6. Sanctions against Burma
Myanmar, formerly known as Burma, has a grim human rights record. There are numerous
reports of gross human rights violations by the Burmese military government, such as apartheid,
forced labor and drug trafficking.301 Millions of ethnic minorities in Burma have fled from
economic and political oppression to Bangladesh, India, China, Malaysia and Thailand to seek
asylum. More than 170,000 Burmese live in nine refugee camps in Thailand and two in
Bangladesh.302
Burma has become the object of international reproach since 1988 when the Burmese
military junta seized power. This military government formed the State Law and Order
Restoration Council (SLORC)303 after a bloody crackdown on a series of democratic movements
led by students. The SLORC nullified the results of the national election in 1990 and arbitrarily
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detained democracy activists including their leader, Aung San Suu Kyi.304 While Burma is a
member state of a number of major human rights treaties,305 including the Convention on the
Rights of the Child, 306 the Convention to Eliminate All Forms of Discrimination against
Women, 307 the Convention to Eliminate All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 308 and the
Genocide Convention,309 the Burmese military government has violated fundamental human
rights norms regarding arbitrary detention, torture, extrajudicial execution, forced child labor,
and coercive relocation of minorities, for more than 10 years.310
Following the Free Burma Act of 1995, the Burma Freedom and Democracy Act of 1996,
Foreign Operations Appropriations Act of 1997, and Executive Order 13047 in 1997,311 in 2003,
the U.S. government imposed new economic sanctions against Burma.312 Other countries and
international organizations joined the U.S. by imposing sanctions against the gross human rights
violations by the Burmese military junta.313 These include the condemnation by U.N. bodies,
monitoring by international organizations and NGOs, severance of diplomatic relations, bans on
foreign assistance, and the prevention of investment in Burma.314
Through the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003, the U.S. government
condemned the Burmese military government as follows.
(1) The State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) has failed to transfer power to the National
League for Democracy (NLD) whose parliamentarians won an overwhelming victory in the 1990
304
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elections in Burma.
(4) .....the SPDC ..... brutally attacked NLD supporters, killed and injured scores of civilians, and
arrested democracy advocate Aung San Suu Kyi and other activists.
(5) The SPDC continues egregious human rights violations against Burmese citizens, uses rape as a
weapon of intimidation and torture against women, and forcibly conscripts child-soldiers for the use
in fighting indigenous ethnic groups.
(6) The SPDC is engaged in ethnic cleansing against minorities within Burma.....which constitutes a
crime against humanity and has directly led to more than 600,000 internally displaced people living
within Burma and more than 130,000 people from Burma living in refugee camps along the ThaiBurma border.315

Under this Act, the U.S. government stressed that sanctions against Burma will not be lifted
until it meets the following conditions:
(B) The SPDC has made measurable and substantial progress toward implementing a democratic
government including
(i) releasing all political prisoners;
(ii) allowing freedom of speech and the press;
(iii) allowing freedom of association;
(iv) permitting the peaceful exercise of religion; and
(v) bringing to a conclusion an agreement between the SPDC and the democratic forces led by the
NLD and Burma's ethnic nationalities on the transfer of power to a civilian government accountable
to the Burmese people through democratic elections under the rule of law.316

Most of the conditions listed in the text of the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of
2003 correspond to international human rights law. Arrests of democracy advocates and their
arbitrary detention, as well as that of other political prisoners, are directly linked with libertyrights stipulated in Article 9 through 15 of the ICCPR.317 In addition, Article 8(3) of the ICCPR

315
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prohibits "forced or compulsory labour,"318 Article 7 prevents torture,319 and Article 18 protects
freedom of thought and religion.320 All of these articles of the ICCPR and most of the major
international human rights treaties are in accord with the human rights violations listed in this
U.S. Act of 2003.
There have been, however, criticisms of the sanctions for their negative effects.

321

For

example, The New York Times reported that the sanctions caused the loss of more than 400,000
jobs in the textile industry of Burma and most of the women who lost their jobs have been forced
to become prostitutes.322
In response to the U.S. sanctions since 1995, the Burmese military government has taken “a
number of modest but significant steps.”323 It released Aung San Suu Kyi, the pro-democracy
leader of the political opposition party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), from her sixyear house arrest in 1995, though her rights to travel and meet other democracy advocates were
restricted.324 In the late 1990s, the use of forced labor declined due to the Burmese government’s
replacement of man power by machinery.325 In 1999, the Burmese government permitted the
International Committee of the Red Cross to reopen its office in the capital of Burma and to visit
318

Article 8(3) of the ICCPR
(a) No one shall be required to perform forced or compulsory labour;
(b) Paragraph 3 (a) shall not be held to preclude, in countries where imprisonment with hard labour may be imposed
as a punishment for a crime, the performance of hard labour in pursuance of a sentence to such punishment by a
competent court;
319
Article 7 of the ICCPR, supra note 285.
320
Article 18 of the ICCPR.
1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right shall include freedom to
have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with others and
in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching.
2. No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his
choice.
3. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs may be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and
are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.
321
See Nicholas D. Kristof, “Our Man in Havana,” N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 2003, p.A15.
322
Ibid.
323
Sarah H. Cleveland, supra note 12, pp.19-20.
324
Ibid.
325
Ibid.
- 58 -

Burmese prisons on a regular basis.326 Since October 2000, the Burmese military government
had engaged Aung San Suu Kyi, the head of the NLD, in peace talks for a political settlement in
Burma.327 On July 27, 2000, the government reopened most universities which had been closed
since 1996.328 In addition, the Burmese military government periodically released small groups
of political prisoners and 182 of them had been freed by November 2002.329 Overall, the U.S.
economic sanctions against Burma and its support for the Burmese democracy movement have
played an essential role in promoting change in Burma. There are still strong criticisms on the
effect of the U.S. sanctions against Burma.330 However, this paper believes that the refusal of
China and ASEAN to support the U.S. sanctions should be the main target of such criticisms
because Burmese economy is heavily dependent on the export of natural resources like natural
gas to those countries.

3.3.7. Effect of U.S. Economic Sanctions
All five cases reviewed above illustrate the idea that the U.S. economic sanctions reinforce
fundamental human rights. In each case, it is quite clear that the sanctions stipulated in the text of
the legislations are against the gross human rights violations recognized in international law,
including the U.N. Charter.
Therefore, this paper argues that the sanctions by the U.S. government have at least some
positive effects on international human rights law. Undoubtedly, these economic sanctions had
some negative effects on the targeted states. In numerous reports and articles, scholars and
326
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human rights advocates have constantly argued that economic sanctions hurt large numbers of
innocent civilians in the targeted states not only by limiting the availability of food and medicine,
but also by disrupting the whole economy, depriving civilians of essential income, and reducing
the national capacity of water treatment, electrical systems and other infrastructure critical for
health and life.331
However, the cases discussed above demonstrate that the U.S. economic sanctions have
played an important role in “broadening and deepening the global response” to the human rights
crisis in the targeted states.332 They also show that the sanctions induced the targeted states to
accept international treaty obligations including human rights norms and modestly change their
human rights policies. In most of the cases, ultimately the targeted state entered into a
comprehensive agreement including the protection of human rights with the international
community in order to have the sanctions lifted.
Economic sanctions cannot be a sole cause of civilian suffering in targeted states. The
targeted states should bear the heavy burden of responsibility for people’s suffering. It is
undeniable that economic sanctions have inherent flaws. However, they should not object
sanctions because of these flaws and negative effects. The problem is not in the sanctions
themselves, but in their effect. Therefore, the criticism on economic sanctions should focus on
finding a way to decrease their negative effects, rather than on arguing for not imposing them
without providing a better alternative.
Overall, the U.S. economic sanctions have been part of a collective effort by the
international community to develop current human rights norms and to protect and promote
fundamental human rights in the targeted states.
331
332
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3.4. Economic Sanctions by the E.U.
3.4.1. General Perspective
The European Union established one of the most effective international systems for the
protection of human rights333 and has imposed economic sanctions against gross human rights
violation.
In recent years, the E.U. has frequently imposed sanctions334 following its own basic law or
the UN Security Council resolutions. The E.U. imposes sanctions for the specific objectives of
the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). These objectives are stipulated in Article 11
of the Treaty on European Union. It states:
1. The Union shall define and implement a common foreign and security policy covering all areas of
foreign and security policy, the objectives of which shall be:
— to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the Union
in conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter,
— to strengthen the security of the Union in all ways,
— to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the
United Nations Charter, as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the
Paris Charter, including those on external borders,
— to promote international cooperation,
— to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and
fundamental freedoms

335

(emphasis added).

Respect for human rights and fundamental freedom is one of the objectives clearly
prescribed in the Treaty. Thus, sanctions against gross human rights violations are recognized as
lawful measures by the E.U. In addition, as the U.N Charter confers power on the Security
Council to impose sanctions through its resolutions in order to restore international peace and
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security,336 the E.U. implements sanctions imposed by the Security Council resolutions not only
based upon the U.N. Charter, but also pursuant to the Treaty on European Union.
In 2004, in order to develop a policy framework for more effective use of sanctions, the
Political and Security Committee under the Council of the European Union prepared a draft of
the Basic Principles on the Use of Restrictive Measures (Sanctions). Selected paragraphs of this
draft are cited below:
1. We are committed to the effective use of sanctions as an important way to maintain and restore
international peace and security in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter and of our
common foreign and security policy. In this context, the Council will work continuously to support
the UN and fulfil our obligations under the UN Charter.
3. If necessary, the Council will impose autonomous EU sanctions in support of efforts to fight
terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and as a restrictive measure to
uphold respect for human rights, democracy, the rule of law and good governance. We will do this
in accordance with our common foreign and security policy, as set out in Article 11 TEU, and in full
conformity with our obligations under international law.
4. The Council will work to enlist the support of the widest possible range of partners in support of
EU autonomous sanctions which will be more effective when they are reinforced by broad
international support.
6. Sanctions should be targeted in a way that has maximum impact on those whose behaviour we
want to influence. Targeting should reduce to the maximum extent possible any adverse
humanitarian effects or unintended consequences for persons not targeted or neighbouring
countries. Measures, such as arms embargoes, visa bans and the freezing of funds are a way of
achieving this.
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Position requires unanimity from E.U. Member States in Council.339 If the Common Position
provides for imposing sanctions against targeted states, Article 301340 and 60341 of the Treaty
establishing the European Community is applied.
In some cases, it is possible to implement economic sanctions through a CFSP legal
instrument and a pre-existing Regulation. Currently, there are two pre-existing regulations which
are closely related to the sanctions against gross human rights violations. The first one is Council
Regulation 2368 of 2002.342 It aims to control the trade of rough diamonds due to the deep
concerns about “the devastating impact of conflicts fuelled by the trade in conflict diamonds on
the peace, safety and security of people in affected countries and the systematic and gross human
rights violations that have been perpetrated in such conflicts.”343 This regulation is also related
to the Kimberley Process, which was established in 2002 as an international forum to control the
trade in rough diamonds.344 The second one is Council Regulation 1236 of 2005.345 This
regulation prohibits the export from or import to the E.U. of certain goods which can be used for
capital punishment, torture or other cruel and inhuman treatment.
Economic sanctions imposed by the E.U. include arms embargos, specific or general import
and export bans, restrictions on financial assistance, travel bans and other appropriate measures.
339
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The arms embargo applies to the items listed in the E.U. Common Military List.346 It may
be extended to related financial and technical assistance, and to items which may be used for
internal repression which in many cases is considered a human rights violation. In addition, in
the case of an arms embargo, Article 296 of the Treaty establishing the European Community
allows member states to use their domestic measures for an embargo of military related goods.347
Thus, an arms embargo is imposed by a Common Position of the E.U., and implemented
pursuant to the national legislation of the member states.

3.4.2. Sanctions adopted by the E.U.
The following are cases of economic sanctions imposed by the E.U. at least partially for
human rights violations.
3.4.2.1. Sanctions against Belarus
The Council of the E.U. adopted Common Position 2004/661/CFSP to impose sanctions348
against the Belarusian government349 for the enforced disappearances of three pro-democracy
persons in 1999 and one well-known journalist in 2000.
In 2004, in response to the fraudulent elections and a series of gross human rights violations
by the Belarusian government during the repression of peaceful demonstrations in the aftermath
of the elections, the E.U. adopted Common Position 2004/848/CFSP to strengthen and expand
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the sanctions against Belarus by amending its previous Common Position.350
In 2006, the Belarusian government arbitrarily arrested more than 500 people who had
exercised their right of free assembly to protest the fraudulent presidential elections on 19 March
2006.351 The Election Observation Mission of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human
Rights (ODIHR) of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) concluded
that the presidential election in 2006 was severely flawed and fell significantly short of Belarus'
OSCE commitments.352 Based upon this final report of ODIHR, the E.U. consequently adopted
Common Position 2006/276/CFSP to impose sanctions against the Belarusian government
including President Lukashenko for “the violation of international electoral standards and the
crackdown on civil society and democratic opposition.”353 The economic sanctions included a
travel ban and an assets freeze. In May 2006, Council Regulation 765/2006 was adopted to
enforce Common Position 2006/276/CFSP.354

3.4.2.2. Sanctions against Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)
In 2003, the E.U. adopted Common Position 2003/680/CFSP in order to implement Security
Council Resolution 1493355 which imposed an arms embargo against the DRC.356 In 2005,
Common Position 2005/440/CFSP was adopted pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1596357
which strengthened the sanctions against the DRC including a freeze of all funds, financial assets
350
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and economic resources and a travel ban.358 Based upon this Common Position, the E.U.
adopted Council Regulations 889/2005359 and 1183/2005360 to enforce such sanctions.

3.4.2.3. Sanctions against Côte d’Ivoire
In 2004 and 2006, the E.U. Council adopted Common Position 2004/852/CFSP and 2006/30
/CFSP pursuant to Security Council Resolutions 1572 361 and 1643. 362

363

Based upon the

resolutions, economic sanctions including “embargo on arms and related materiel, ban on exports
of equipment for internal repression, ban on certain services, restrictions on admission, freezing
of funds and economic resources of certain persons who constitute a threat to the peace and
national reconciliation process in Côte d’Ivoire, and import ban on diamonds” were imposed by
the Common Position.364 Then, to enforce this Common Position, the E.U. legislated Council
Regulations 174/2005365 and 560/2005.366

3.4.2.4. Sanctions against Haiti
On June 2, 1994, Common Position 94/315/CFSP 367 was adopted in accordance with
Security Council Resolutions 917, 841, 873, and 875. Specifically pursuant to paragraph 4 of
Resolution 917,368 the E.U. decided to reduce its economic relations with Haiti and to impose
necessary sanctions to freeze the funds and financial resources of the Haitian military
358
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government under this Common Position.369 Council Regulation 1264/1994 was also adopted
under this Common Position on the same day.370

3.4.2.5. Sanctions against Burma
In 1996 the E.U. adopted Common Position 96/635/CFSP to impose sanctions against
Burma371 for the continuing human rights violations by the Burmese military government,372
including detention of pro-democracy advocates, forced labor, torture and oppression of the
freedom of religion and speech. These included “arms embargo, ban on exports of equipment for
internal repression, freezing of funds and economic resources, restrictions on admission, ban on
financing of Burmese state-owned companies, suspension of certain aid and development
programs, suspension of high level bilateral governmental visits and reduction of diplomatic
relations.”373
The sanctions imposed by Common Position 96/635/CFSP were replaced and renewed
subsequently by the adoption of Common Position 2003/297/CFSP in 2003, Common Position
2004/423/CFSP in 2004, and Common Position 2006/318/CFSP in 2006.374
369
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3.4.2.6. Sanctions against the Sudan
In January 2004, the E.U. adopted Common Position 2004/31/CFSP concerning the
imposition of an embargo on arms, munitions and military equipment for the Sudan375 to
promote peace and reconciliation within the country. In 2005, pursuant to Security Council
Resolution 1556 of 2004376 and Resolution 1591 of 2005377, the E.U. adopted Common Position
2005/411/CFSP to extend its sanctions against the Sudan.378
These comprehensive sanctions comprise “[r]estrictions on admission of persons who
infringe UN arms embargo or human rights, prohibition to grant, sell, supply or transfer technical
assistance and to provide financing or financial assistance related to military activities, freezing
of funds and economic resources of persons who infringe UN arms embargo or human rights,
and embargo on arms and related materials,” under Common Position 2005/411/CFSP.379

3.4.2.7. Sanctions against Zimbabwe
Following the huge frustration of the 2000 national referendum to change the constitution,
the human rights situation in Zimbabwe has been of grave concern to the international

Burma/Myanmar, those who benefit most from its misrule, and those who actively frustrate the process of national
reconciliation, respect for human rights and democracy.
375
Common Position 2004/31/CFSP (January, 10, 2004), 2004 OJ (L 6) 55; To implement this Common Position,
Council Regulation 131/2004 (OJ L21, 1) was adopted on January, 28, 2004. For example, Article 2 states:
Article 2. It shall be prohibited:
(a) to grant, sell, supply or transfer technical assistance related to military activities and to the provision,
manufacture, maintenance and use of arms and related materiel of all types, including weapons and ammunition,
military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment, and spare parts for the aforementioned, directly or
indirectly to any person, entity or body in, or for use in Sudan;
(b) to provide financing or financial assistance related to military activities, including in particular grants, loans and
export credit insurance, for any sale, supply, transfer or export of arms and related materiel, or for any grant, sale,
supply, or transfer of related technical assistance, directly or indirectly to any person, entity or body in, or for use in
Sudan.
376
Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan, supra note 220.
377
Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan, supra note 221.
378
Common Position 2005/411/CFSP (June, 2, 2005), 2005 OJ (L139) 25.
379
Ibid.
- 68 -

community. 380 The Zimbabwean government has persecuted the supporters of the political
opposition and human rights advocates, with the objective of eliminating any dissent against the
government policies.381 Human rights violations by the Zimbabwean government have steadily
increased in the form of “state-sponsored intimidation, arbitrary arrest, torture and attacks on
human rights defenders.” 382 Furthermore, the government’s repression has caused severe
economic decline and food shortage.383
In 2002, the E.U. adopted Common Position 2002/145/CFSP to impose sanctions against
Zimbabwe, including an arms embargo, prohibition of related technical training or assistance,
freezing of government funds, and travel bans.384 Because of the aggravated human rights
situation in Zimbabwe, the E.U. decided to extend and strengthen the sanctions against the
Zimbabwean government, which “bear[s] a wide responsibility for serious violations of human
rights and of the freedom of opinion, of association and of peaceful assembly.”385 Common
Position 2002/145/CFSP was amended and renewed by Common Position 2002/600/CFSP of
2002,386 Common Position 2003/115/CFSP of 2003,387 and Common Position 2004/161/CFSP
of 2004.388
With its Common Position, the E.U. clearly indicated that the objective of these sanctions is
“to reject policies that lead to the suppression of human rights, of the freedom of expression and

380
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of good governance.”389 The current sanctions will be valid until February 20, 2008.390

3.4.3. Targeted Sanctions
As discussed in Chapter III. 2 and 3 of this paper, the criticism against the sanctions by the
Security Council and the U.S. also applies to the sanctions imposed by the E.U.
Therefore, to reduce the negative impact of broad economic sanctions on civilian
populations in the targeted states, the E.U. has actively discussed a way of mitigating any
negative humanitarian impact of economic sanctions.
These are known as targeted or smart sanctions as stipulated in the project paper on E.U.
Best Practices for the Effective Implementation of Restrictive Measures 391 adopted by the
Council of the European Union. In 2003, the Council adopted Guidelines on Implementation and
Evaluation of Restrictive Measures in the Framework of the CFSP.392 Based upon them, in
February 2004, the Foreign Relations Counsellors Working Party was established to develop
more effective and well-designed implementation of the sanctions. 393 This Council body
proposed a detailed and thoughtful draft on this wide-ranging subject and subsequently, the
Council adopted this project paper in December 2005.394
While they are not legally binding for the E.U. and its member states, these guidelines were
adopted by the Council with the intention of using them to impose future sanctions. Targeted
sanctions include “financial, travel, aviation, arms and commodities restrictions on individuals
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or corporate entities with the objective of applying coercive pressure on transgressing parties,
leaders and the network of elites and entities who support them.”395 (emphasis added.)
The guidelines provide clear criteria for the purposes of determining who should be listed
and who should be not listed where individuals or specific entities are subject to targeted
sanctions.396 They also present specific conditions and procedures for exemptions from the
sanctions.397 For example, in connection to humanitarian exemptions, paragraph 55 states:
55. While acting consistently with the letter and spirit of the Regulations, the competent authority
shall take into account fundamental rights when granting exemptions to cover basic needs.398

Many individual member states of the E.U. have also worked on this project.399
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IV. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS

AGAINST

HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS

UNDER THE

WTO SYSTEM
The World Trade Organization (WTO) deals with the rules of trade between nations at the
international level. Its foremost goal is “free trade.” To achieve this goal, the WTO trade system
tries to eliminate almost all types of trade barriers by individual member states which can
undermine trade liberalization.400
This is clearly stipulated in Article I: General Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment,401 and
Article III: National Treatment on Internal Taxation and Regulation, 402 of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1947: hereafter GATT).
On the other hand, under certain conditions, the GATT allows exceptions from the general
agreement, as stipulated in Article XX: General Exceptions 403 and Article XXI: Security
Exceptions.404
This Chapter will argue that while economic sanctions are in principle contrary to the free
trade provisions of the GATT, economic sanctions against gross human rights violations are
allowed under the exceptional provisions of the GATT in the WTO system.
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4.1. Free Trade Provisions of the GATT
Article I and Article III require a Most-Favoured-Nations Treatment (MFN) and a National
Treatment (NT) in the trade policy of the individual member states. Each provision states:
Article I: General Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment
1. With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on or in connection with
importation or exportation or imposed on the international transfer of payments for imports or
exports, and with respect to the method of levying such duties and charges, and with respect to all
rules and formalities in connection with importation and exportation, and ..... [a]ny advantage,
favour, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party to any product originating in or
destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like
product originating in or destined for the territories of all other contracting parties.
Article III: National Treatment on Internal Taxation and Regulation
2. The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any other
contracting party shall not be subject, directly or indirectly, to internal taxes or other internal
charges of any kind in excess of those applied, directly or indirectly, to like domestic products.....
4. The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any other
contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like products
of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale,
offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use.....405

As stated above, these free trade provisions require member states respectively to give equal
market access to “like” products from all other GATT member states, and prohibit any
discrimination between domestic products of member states and “like” products of other member
states. In addition, the member states of the GATT can refuse MFN or NT only for the reasons
expressly mentioned in the GATT. Otherwise, member states cannot impose conditions on MFN
or NT like the targeted state’s compliance with international human rights law. For example, the

405

Article I & Article III of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1947) available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/gatt47_e.pdf
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U.S. withdrawal of MFN from Poland in 1980s406 would have been a violation of the GATT, if
Poland had objected.
Furthermore, Article XI prohibits each member state of the GATT from imposing so-called
Non-Tariff Barriers to its own trade policies for import. This provision states:
Article XI: General Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions
1. No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges, whether made effective
through quotas, import or export licences or other measures, shall be instituted or maintained by
any contracting party on the importation of any product of the territory of any other contracting
party or on the exportation or sale for export of any product destined for the territory of any other
contracting party.407

As stated above, Non-Tariff Barriers include quotas, import or export licensing restrictions
and embargoes as a form of import restraints.408 As it is worded, Article XI applies to all import
restrictions “other than duties, taxes or other charges.” The goal of this provision is “to promote
transparency in the international trading system” by decreasing the possibility of each member
state using any type of camouflaged Non-Tariff Barriers in its trade.409
All economic sanctions against gross human rights violations are initially and inherently, a
violation of these free trade provisions of the GATT because most of them depend on embargoes,
the barring of the export of goods related to human rights violations to the targeted states, and the
prohibition of the import of goods from the targeted states. What is more, not all human rights
violations have direct linkage to international trade: for example, as discussed in Chapter III, the
use of forced labor in Burma, the subversion of democracy in Haiti, Belarus, and Zimbabwe,

406
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torture, arbitrary arrest, detention, and deprivation of religious freedom in most of the targeted
states.

4.2. Exceptional Provisions of the GATT
4.2.1. Article XXI (Security Exceptions)
In 1949, Czechoslovakia complained against the U.S. for its prevention of certain exports to
Czechoslovakia.410 The GATT Contracting Parties rejected the Czechoslovakian complaint with
the following contention:
..... thought that since the question clearly concerned Article XXI, the United States action would
seem to be justified because every country must have the last resort on questions relating to its own
security. On the other hand, the CONTRACTING PARTIES should be cautious not to take any step
which might have the effect of undermining the General Agreement.411

As a result, in 1951 the U.S. suspended the MFN status of communist states, including
Czechoslovakia.412
In 1985, President Reagan prohibited all trade with Nicaragua on the ground of national
security pursuant to Article XXI. The U.S. also argued that, “[t]he GATT is not an appropriate
forum for debating political and security issues.”413 Then, in its report, the GATT panel reached
the following conclusion:
.....as it was not authorized to examine the justification for the U.S. invocation of a general
exception to the obligations under the General Agreement, it could find the United States neither to
be complying with its obligations under the General Agreement nor to be failing to carry out its

410
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414

obligations under that Agreement.

Because of Nicaragua’s opposition, however, this panel report was not adopted.
In addition, Sweden and Ghana, respectively, tried to justify trade restrictions based upon
this article in 1961 and 1975.415
Article XXI of the GATT contains a general exception to all obligations of the GATT for
certain measures imposed by a member state in view of the necessity to protect its essential
security interests. This provision states:
Article XXI: Security Exceptions
Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed
(b) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action which it considers necessary for the
protection of its essential security interests
(i) relating to fissionable materials or the materials from which they are derived;
(ii) relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition and implements of war and to such traffic in
other goods and materials as is carried on directly or indirectly for the purpose of supplying a
military establishment;
(iii) taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations; or
(c) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action in pursuance of its obligations under
the United Nations Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security.416 (emphasis
added.)

While there are three specific situations stipulated in Article XXI(b), the exceptions are “too
broad to be subject to abuse.”417 Thus, the problem is how to define the scope of Article XXI
and whether economic sanctions against human rights violations can be applied to this article or
not.
Based upon Article XXI(b)(i) and (ii), this paper argues that economic sanctions against
414
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416
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human rights violations in the form of an arms embargo should be justified. Whether a
prohibition on the import or export of arms and related materials for human rights violation is
necessary for the protection of essential security interests of the sanctioning state or not is
unclear. However, as the GATT panel concluded in the Nicaragua case,418 the WTO may have
jurisdiction in determining whether trade restriction measures are related to “fissionable
materials or the traffic in arms, ammunition and implements of war” rather than in determining
whether there is national security interest or not. Therefore, as long as the sanctioning state
argues its necessity for the protection of essential security interests, economic sanctions like arms
embargos can be regarded as legitimate trade restriction measures under Article XXI(b)(i) and
(ii).
More controversial is the provision in Article XXI(b)(iii) concerning the economic sanctions
against human rights violations. The most important issue is how to define “international
emergencies.” This term is not defined in international law, either. In the Nicaragua case,
Nicaragua argued that “international emergencies” should be limited to situations that meet the
conditions for self-defense under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter.419 Contrary to this position,
some scholars argue that a state can determine the existence of “international emergencies” by
itself, based upon its security interests.420
As reviewed in Chapter III.2, the U.N., especially through the Security Council, has
increasingly recognized gross human rights violations as a threat to peace and international
security, in many cases: Rhodesia, Iraq, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Somalia, Rwanda,
Sierra Leone, Liberia, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, and the Sudan.
418
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The U.S. has also increasingly recognized gross human rights violations as national security
emergencies. For instance, as discussed in Chapter III.3.B, President Clinton described the
Burmese military government's enormities as “an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national
security and foreign policy of the United States.”421 While it is hard to accept that the Burmese
military government’s actions constituted an “extraordinary threat” to the U.S. security, it is an
undeniable fact that the gross human rights violations by the Burmese military government were
against the international human rights norms and the international community as a whole took
certain actions including economic sanctions for the promotion and protection of fundamental
human rights.
Therefore, this paper argues that based upon such evolving international practice, gross
human rights violations should be considered international emergencies. Such violations are the
infringement of Jus Cogens. This paper also argues that this interpretation of Article XXI(b)(iii)
will enhance the international human rights norms by allowing economic sanctions against gross
human rights violations.

4.2.2. Article XX (General Exceptions)
Another possible approach to make economic sanctions against gross human rights
violations a legitimate trade restriction measure under the GATT is in Article XX. It states:
Article XX: General Exceptions
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a
means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions
prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be
construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures:
421
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(a) necessary to protect public morals;
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health;
(e) relating to the products of prison labour;422 (emphasis added).

To be a general exception under the WTO system, economic sanctions against human rights
violations should satisfy one of this article’s exceptions stipulated from (a) to (j) and its
substantive condition.423 Moreover, the sanctions should meet the requirement stated in the
chapeau to this article.424 In the context of Article XX, the Article XX(a) exception for measures
“necessary to protect public morals,” the Article XX(b) exception for measures “necessary to
protect human ... life or health,” and the Article XX(e) exception for measures “relating to the
products of prison labour,” have increased the likelihood of allowing economic sanctions against
human rights violations.
The first question to raise is the scope of jurisdiction for Article XX, General Exceptions.
The Article XX(e) exception clearly recognizes “extraterritorial” jurisdiction by allowing trade
restriction measures against a foreign state’s prison labor.425 The Article XX(b) exception only
applies to trade restriction measures for the protection of “human, animal or plant life or health”
within a member state’s own jurisdiction.426 The Article XX(a) exception has never been the
subject of interpretation in dispute settlement processes of the WTO and as a result,427 the scope
of “public morals” can be potentially extended to international human rights concerns, to some
extent. In the “United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products” case,
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the WTO construed that Article XX grants some authority for individual states to act against a
foreign state’s conduct.428 However, it is still a very controversial issue.
The second question is the scope of human rights implicated in Article XX, General
Exceptions. In other words, the question is whether fundamental human rights norms can be
incorporated into the Article XX exceptions or not.
The Article XX(a) exception on public morals may include slavery, the prevention of racial
discrimination, the prevention of gender discrimination, the freedom of speech, the freedom of
assembly, the freedom of religion and possibly democracy. The Article XX(b) exception on
human life could be understood as crimes against humanity, genocide, summary execution, and
disappearance. The Article XX(e) exception on prison labor is initially harder to extend.
However, it can at least be interpreted to allow trade restrictions on products under prison-like
conditions, e.g. forced labor, including child labor.
However, there is not much possibility of economic sanctions against human rights
violations to be accepted under Article XX , General Exceptions, in the WTO system. The reason
is that the WTO’s strict adherence to both the “necessity” requirement of Article XX (a) and (b),
and the “proportionality” requirement of the chapeau, hinders the adoption of economic
sanctions against gross human rights violations. 429 These requirements make Article XX,
General Exceptions, “an unattractive locus” for economic sanctions against human rights
violations.430
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4.3. Reconciling International Economic Law with International Human Rights Law
This paper maintains that the GATT should be interpreted consistently with international
law. That is, trade restriction measures against gross human rights violations are compatible with
the GATT. As discussed in Chapter II and III, fundamental human rights violations are no longer
just the domestic concern of each individual state.
The evolving of international human rights law for last 60 years has been in two parallel
directions. First, international human rights norms which are recognized as Jus Cogens provide
the legality for the international community’s intervention in offending states. Second, the Erga
Omnes status of international human rights norms shows that every state has an interest in having
these human rights norms observed by other states. All of these norms authorize economic
sanctions not only by the international community including the U.N., but also by each
individual state.
Overall, while some economic sanctions may conflict with the main goal of the WTO, i.e.
free trade, economic sanctions against human rights violations do not undermine the WTO
system itself. Rather, they can be adapted to the WTO’s free trade framework under international
law.
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V. CONCLUSION
This paper reviews the role of economic sanctions in international human rights law.
Chapter II examines the principle of non-intervention and its exceptions in international
human rights law. The chapter concluded that the relationship between human rights and state
sovereignty should and can be complementary. The protection and promotion of human rights
can be enhanced with a respect for state sovereignty. The state should be viewed not as the
denier of human rights, but as the protector and promoter of the human rights of its nationals.
The respect for state sovereignty can be realized by protecting the fundamental rights of its
nationals through national law. In other words, each individual state has a responsibility to
protect and promote the human rights of its own nationals based upon the principle of
sovereignty. State sovereignty and independence should serve not as a hurdle to, but as a
guarantee for the realization of the fundamental human rights of the state’s nationals. Each
individual state, then, should cooperate with others to carry out their obligations under state
sovereignty and international human rights law.
Chapter II also maintains that the concept of human rights has been expanded and the core
human rights are inalienable and legally enforceable ones. The concept of sovereignty has also
been developed and one of its tenets is the protection of the state’s nationals’ fundamental rights
from state interference and the abuse of power by the government. The evolvement of
international human rights law is one of the most remarkable innovations in modern international
law. If gross human rights violations, especially those established by the status of Jus Cogens or
obligations Erga Omnes, are not solved by a state itself, it is no longer solely the problem of this
state. Therefore, this paper concludes that fundamental human rights have acquired a status of
universality and the international community should accept this.
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Chapter III reviews the doctrines and practices of economic sanctions for human rights
protection by the U.N. Security Council, the U.S., and the E.U. All cases of economic sanctions
against gross human rights violations discussed, ten by the Security Council, five by the U.S. and
seven by the E.U., were provided as samples to illustrate the idea that economic sanctions by the
international community as a whole bolster fundamental human rights. In each case, it was quite
clear that the sanctions mentioned in the text of the resolutions, legislation and Common
Positions against gross human rights violations, were codified in international law, including the
U.N. Charter. If all cases of sanctions against human rights violations were examined, they
would only further support this conclusion. Therefore, this paper concludes that the sanctions by
the Security Council, the U.S. and the E.U. have at least some positive effects on international
human rights law. They build international human rights norms. This development leads to the
growing willingness of the international community and other individual states to deal with gross
human rights violations with one effective tool of modern international law, economic sanctions.
Undeniably, these economic sanctions have had some negative effects on the targeted states.
In numerous reports and articles, scholars and human rights advocates have constantly argued
that economic sanctions hurt large numbers of innocent civilians in the targeted states not only
by limiting the availability of food and medicine, but also by disrupting the whole economy,
depriving civilians of essential income, and reducing the national capacity for water treatment,
electrical systems and other infrastructure critical for health and life. The cases discussed,
however, demonstrate that the sanctions forced the targeted states to accept international treaty
obligations including human rights norms and modestly change their human rights policies. In
most of the cases, the targeted state entered into a comprehensive agreement including the
protection of human rights with the international community in order to have the sanctions
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ultimately lifted. What is more, economic sanctions cannot be the sole cause of civilian suffering
in the targeted states. The targeted states should bear the heavy burden of responsibility for this
suffering. It is undeniable that economic sanctions have inherent flaws. However, they should
not be abolished because of these flaws and negative effects. The problem is not in the sanctions
themselves, but in their effect. Therefore, the criticism on economic sanctions should focus on
finding a way to decrease their negative effects, rather than arguing against the use of economic
sanctions without providing a better alternative. In addition, in order to reduce the negative
impact of broad economic sanctions on civilian populations in the targeted states, the Security
Council, the U.S. and the E.U. have actively discussed a way of mitigating any negative
humanitarian impact.
Overall, this paper concludes that economic sanctions have become part of a collective
effort by the international community to develop current human rights norms and to protect and
promote fundamental human rights in the targeted states. The international community has been
increasingly willing to recognize gross human rights violation as a matter which threatens
regional and international peace and to grant economic sanctions. Because of the increasing use
of economic sanctions, this paper also concludes that the use of economic sanctions against gross
human rights violations has become an accepted customary international norm.
Chapter IV examines the legality of economic sanctions against human rights violations
under the WTO system and reviews the possibility of harmonizing international economic law
and international human rights law. The chapter concludes that while economic sanctions are
inherently against the free trade provisions of the GATT, economic sanctions against gross
human rights violations are allowed under the exceptional provisions of the GATT in the WTO
system. This paper also argues that the GATT should be interpreted consistently with
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international law. That is, trade restriction measures against gross human rights violations are
compatible with the GATT. As discussed in Chapter II and III, fundamental human rights
violations are no longer just the domestic concern of each individual state. The evolvement of
international human rights law demonstrates that, first, international human rights norms
recognized as Jus Cogens provide the legality for the international community’s intervention in
offending states; and second, the Erga Omnes status of international human rights norms shows
that every state has an interest in other states observing these human rights norms. All of these
norms authorize economic sanctions not only by the international community, including the U.N.,
but also by each individual state. Overall, while some economic sanctions may conflict with the
main goal of the WTO, i.e. free trade, economic sanctions against human rights violations do not
undermine the WTO system itself. Rather, they can be adapted to the WTO’s free trade
framework under international law.
Since the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, there has been a
significant evolution toward the universality of human rights. However, international legal
enforcement systems for human rights norms are still underdeveloped despite the considerable
progress in international human rights law. This paper concludes that economic sanctions can
contribute to a decrease in individual states’ human rights violations and can be an effective
enforcement tool for international law.
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